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ABSTRACT

BEYOND THE POSTMODERN IMPASSE
OF CONTEMPORARY COMPOSITION:
THE NON-FOUNDATIONAL ALTERNATIVE
OF DEWEYAN PRAGMATISM
byDonald C. Jones
University of New Hampshire, September, 1996

In their critique of the autonomous individual of foundationalism,
postm odernists have rejected the epistemological assum ption that a knower
directly perceives reality in thought then expresses these perceptions through
language. Yet as these theorists have asserted the influence of language upon
an individual's thinking, they have been unable to explain an individual's
agency - - the ability to create, assert, examine, and m aintain/ or modify a
belief.

Once considered to be situated in prior discourses, the individual has

been conceived as a postmodern subject dom inated by language. Yet the
subject's ability to influence as well as be influenced by discursive practices
has not been explained by postmodern theorists.

An impasse has been

reached as the previous explanation of an individual's agency has been
rejected yet no tenable alternative has been advanced.
Within contem porary composition studies, this postm odern emphasis
on language's influence upon thought has led to an epistemological divide
between those w riting
autonomous

pedagogies which are believed

foundational author

discursive position.

to assume an

and those that acknowledge a writer's

Yet this divisive categorization risks rejecting the
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valuable writing process practices of Donald Murray and Peter Elbow because
their

pedagogies

have

been

miscast

as

individualistic,

neo-Romantic

expressivisms. Fortunately, a reconsideration of M urray's and Elbow's process
pedagogies is already underw ay; Thomas Newkirk, Stephen Fishman, and
others have started to articulate w hat Janet Emig first termed John Dewey's
"tacit tradition" within w riting process theories. As this dissertation defends
M urray and Elbow by reconceiving them as pragmatist composition theorists,
this tacit tradition will resound in its relevance because Dewey's pragmatic
philosophy also draw s a direction beyond the postmodern problem of agency.
Deweyan pragm atism can explain an individual's agency - - the ability
to create, assert, examine, and m ain tain /o r modify her beliefs - - even as it
acknowledges discursive influences upon those beliefs. By reconceiving such
fundam ental philosophic terms as experience, knowledge, and language,
Dewey provides an alternative, non-foundational account of agency as well as
a theoretical explanation of the best practices of writing process and
postm odern composition instruction.

This dissertation reconstructs and

synthesizes writing process and postm odern pedagogies beyond the impasse
over agency.

viii
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1

INTRODUCTION

Mo one has ever claimed it is easy to read John Dewey's most mature
philosophical thought. As he tries to overcome philosophical problems that
have confounded twentieth century thinkers, Dewey sometimes writes with
the convoluted syntax of a nineteenth century man. Yet his prose is no more
difficult to read than that of Jacques Derrida, and like this later, postmodern
critic of foundationalism, Dewey disrupts and reconceives the very terms of
the philosophic discussion.
In a witty criticism, Randolph Bourne once observed, "No man . . .
with such universally im portant things to say . . . was ever published in
forms more ingeniously contrived to thw art [publicj interest."

Dewey is

never as fluid a w riter as William James, but he was capable of passages of
equal eloquence.

He, for example,

asserts, "[If nature were] a closed

mechanical or closed teleological structure . . . the flickering candle of
consciousness w ould go out" and "The saint sits in his ivory tower while the
burly sinners run the world." Yet those who seek the philosophic importance
of Dewey's writings m ust look on a larger scale than the sentence or the
phrase. For Dewey reconceived such fundam ental term s as experience,
knowledge, and language in order to create a new, com prehensive framework
for philosophy.
Once w hen Dewey was attending a gathering w ith several of his
Columbia University students, someone complained about the difficulty of
com prehending his philosophy.

In response, Dewey gestured towards his
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students and said, "Let some of these young men explain me: it will make a
career for some of them." The teller of this tale and one of Dewey's students,
Irwin Edman, then concludes: "It did."

Edman, Sidney Hooks, and others

devoted their considerable careers to explaining the implications of Deweyan
pragm atism . I believe Dewey's value as a philosopher lies in the synergy of
the principles of his non-foundational thought; their whole exceeds their
parts.

Yet, Dewey too often has been analyzed and applied in piecemeal

fashion, and the results can be disastrous as the example of progressive
education demonstrates.
T hrough the power of thought and text, I w ant to cross the distances
of time and place in order to join the circle of students to which Dewey left
his legacy to be determined. I w ant to consider the significance of the whole,
rather than a part, of Dewey's non-foundational philosophy in order to
resolve the epistemological problem s that divide contem porary composition.
When I began writing this dissertation, my goal was not so ambitious; I
planned to use pragm atism to create an alternative perspective upon the
w riting process theory of Donald Murray. Using Dewey, I wanted to disrupt
the predom inant criticisms of M urray which present him as a neo-Romantic
"expressivist." Unlike most composition scholars,

I had read some of

Dewey's educational philosophy before 1 encountered M urray's w riting
process theory so I considered his composition theory from a different,
D ew eyan viewpoint. Because I im m ediately discerned the pragmatism
implicit in his pedagogy, I resisted the neo-Romantic critiques. I believed they
distorted M urray's pragmatist principles, and the best aspects of his pedagogy
had to be defended since I found them to be very effective with first year
college students.

2
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As I read about the pedagogical alternatives offered by M urray's critics, I
became both more confused and more committed to my dissertation topic
because the specific practices advocated by these supposedly more social
theorists resembled w hat I considered to be the most effective elements of
M urray's process pedagogy. As explained in chapter five, even the concept of
writing as a process has been claimed by Murray's critics as their own
profound insight!

I then realized a pragm atist synthesis of w riting process

and postm odern composition instruction was possible, and it was much
needed if

the best aspects of w riting process and those of postm odern

instruction were to be preserved. For postmodern theory can not explain the
best practices of its ow n com position practitioners. In theory, postm odernists
can not account for a w riter's agency. After critiquing the foundational
concept of agency w hich taught student writers to think then write,
postm odernists can not provide an alternative explanation of an individual's
ability to create, assert, examine, and m aintain/or modify a belief.

Once

postmodernists declared the influence of discourse upon a n individual's
thinking, they have not form ulated a theory of how one can deliberately
influence as well as be influenced by discursive practices. But Dewey has.
When

I

understood

the

postm odern

problem

of

agency,

my

dissertation suddenly expanded from an impassioned, pragm atist defense of
M urray's process pedagogy to a Deweyan reconstruction of contemporary
commposition theory and practice. For Deweyan pragm atism can explain an
individual's agency - - the ability to create, assert, examine, and m aintain/or
modify her beliefs - - even as it acknowledges discursive influences upon
those beliefs.

Of course, w hat I intuited in a moment required months of

reading and drafting be articulated in chapter three. In order to reconstruct

3
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contem porary composition, I have ventured much further into several areas
than I originally anticipated.

Rather than begin a pragm atist defense of

M urray with the discrepancies between his w riting process theory and what
his critics claim he states (now included in chapter four), I start by presenting
the problem of agency and its importance to contem porary composition
practices in chapter one.

I

link this theoretical impasse to the troubling

practices of Lester Faigley's and James Berlin's postm odern pedagogies, then I
examine the incomplete efforts by several theorists to overcome this problem.
In chapter two, I trace the path of this composition problem to its
theoretical origins in structuralism and poststructuralism . I have limited my
discussion of the postm odern theories of Roland Barthes, Jacques Derrida,
and Michel Foucault to the problem of agency, but I have relied upon existing
scholarship to show that I am not the first person to discern the shortcomings
of these theorists when they try to account for individual agency. I consider
chapter three to be the most im portant one of this dissertation because Dewey
reconceives the basic terms of philosophy and a reader's failure to understand
Dewey's non-foundational reconception of philosophy thw arts the pragm atist
reconstruction of writing process pedagogies in chapter four and its synthesis
with postm odern composition instruction in chapter five. In chapter three, 1
establish the pattern of explaining Dewey's reconception of experience, then
knowledge, then language, and finally agency. Yet as I begin by asserting the
primacy of experience, I have been careful to avoid presenting experience as a
prior absolute, a first cause. Instead I stipulate, "Dewey's concept of experience
. . .

cannot be com prehended fully until his concept of language is also

understood."

In chapters four and five, I follow this sequence of Dewey's

reconceptions of experience, then knowledge, language, and agency in order
4
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to reconstruct and synthesize w riting process and postm odern composition
instruction as a pragm atist pedagogy.

In the final chapter, I am trying to

present the pedagogical possibilities of a Deweyan composition course so that
contem porary theorists and practitioners can follow this new direction
beyond the problem of agency.

5
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6

CHAPTER I

WHAT DO THE 'GOOD FENCES'ACROSS THE HELD
OF COMPOSITION STUDIES 'WALL OUT' ?
"Reform m ovem ents are notoriously ahistorical."
- - Lawrence Cremin
"John Dewey is everywhere in our work."
- - Janet Emig

Product. Process. Cognitive Research. Social Construction. Expressive.
Epistemic.

These labels, often paired in binary opposition, dominate too

much of the recent history of composition studies. Like the "good fences" of
Robert Frost's poem "M ending Wall," these taxonomic terms can be used to
organize the field of composition. Yet we should not erect these barriers too
readily, and we should never act as though they are set in stone. Like Frost's
narrator, we need to pause and ponder his question: "Before I built a wall I'd
ask to know /W hat I was w alling in or walling out."

When the complexity

and the diversity w ithin a category of composition theories are reduced to a
single term, such as "product" or "current-traditional,"

then this discipline

dismisses too m uch of its rich history. As the first sentence of The
Development of Writing Abilities

prophetically warns: "We classify at our

peril" (1). 1
As

recent

reform ers

composition studies, they

have

announced

their

new

directions

for

usually have erected these perilous fences and

reduced the past to "a m onolithic tradition" deserving dismissal (Meyers 154).
For example, at the start of the m odem w riting process movement, Ken
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Macrorie attacked those "deadly things called themes . . . [written with] a
dehydrated academic tongue" to make a decisive break with the previous
emphasis on the w ritten product (vii). Donald M urray's 1972 article entitled
T each W riting as a Process, not Product” provided the divisive slogan of
this movement.

When Janet Emig's The Composing Processes of Twelfth

Graders transform ed the advances of writing process advocates into an
agenda for cognitivist researchers, she likewise declared product-oriented
w riting instruction to be "pedagogically, developmentally, and politically an
anachronism " (Composing 100, see Faigley Fragments 30).
By defining their new m ovem ent in opposition to a reductive, hence
ahistorical, version of the past, writing process theorists replicated some of
the very problems they sought to resolve.
ignored h o w

As product-oriented instruction

the desired product was to be produced, writing process

pedagogy initially concealed w hat

the desired product was.

As student

writers learned "the way language works in us," Ken Macrorie assum ed good
writing w ould result from this "freeing . . . [of the students'] natural powers of
language and perception" (telling

4, vii). These writers would write well

naturally; no one would have to explain the desired features of the final draft.
Students would not need to read the exemplary texts of published authors
because, as Donald M urray declared, "process can not be inferred from
product any more than a pig can be inferred from a sausage" (Learning 18).
Subsequent warnings by

Ann Berthoff and Thomas Newkirk to consider

product and process dialectically, rather than dichotomously,

have been

heeded only slowly. 2
As cognitive researchers and social constructionists have announced
their own

successive

reforms of composition studies,

they

too

have

reductively critiqued the predecessors against whom they have defined

7
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themselves. Cognitivist theorists have conceived of w riting process theories
as entirely

natural and

spontaneous as they have presented

a more

mechanical and deliberate model of the composing process. To critique the
writing process "m etaphor of discovery," Linda Flower and John Haves, two
leading cognitivist researchers, have had to ignore D onald M urray's assertion
that

"a w riter must plan and calculate, scheme and decide . . . mak[e| a

thousand executive decisions" (Flower and Hayes 21, A

Writer 6). By

countering the incomplete, language-centered writing process theories with a
more m ind-oriented, cognitive model, Flower, Hayes, and their colleagues
have provided a useful schema of the factors that contribute to a writer's
derisions.

Unfortunately, they have been no more able than their writing

process predecessors to explain the reasons a w riter makes a particular
decision during composing.
To explain a w riter's particular derisions, social theorists argue that a
w riter's position within discourse communities m ust be considered because
expectations for w riting are socially constructed. Unlike their writing process
predecessors who explain a writer composing w ithin a large, implicit
language group, social theorists emphasize the differences between smaller,
explicitly distinguished
example,

highlights

discourse communities. D avid Bartholomae, for
the

differences between academ ic

discourses in order to help disadvantaged student w riters
the university,"

and

personal

learn to "invent

to participate in the community of academ ic discourse(s)

which is more compatible with the family language of their more privileged
peers (134). Through this emphasis on diverse academic and cultural contexts,
Bartholomae

situates each w riter

in one or more discourse communities

marked by power relations.
As Bartholomae and his colleagues take this "social turn" toward

8
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"post-process, post-cognitive theory,"

James Berlin and Patricia Bizzell have

'walled out' too much of the complexity and the diversity of writing process
and cognitive process theories (Trimbur 108, 109). In a series of influential
analyses, Berlin criticizes

the w riting process concept of a writer because it

slights

of

the

importance

language

and

"denies

the

place

of

intersubjective, social processes" of composing (Rhetoric and Reality

the
146).

Berlin contends that this concept of a writer depends on the expression, or the
pressing out, of an "internal apprehension" of truth from a prior, absolute
self so he categorizes w riting process theories as "expressive" ("Contemporary
Composition" 771).
From this questionable epistemological analysis, Berlin further argues
that these individualistic composition theories can be "easily co-opted" by
capitalism which, as a professed Marxist, he opposes ("Rhetoric and Ideology"
487). The w riting process emphases, such as on originality and self-discovery,
reinforce the capitalistic principles of initiative and personal responsibility.
For example, when Peter Elbow advocates writing

process techniques like

freewriting to enable students to "take more control over their own lives" by
"gain[ingj control over words,"
emphasis

precludes

Berlin objects that this individualistic

the effective collaboration and

necessary for true freedom (Writing

Without

Teachers

cultural criticism
vii). Yet Berlin's

criticisms ignore the intersubjectivity suggested by w riting process theorists.
Elbow acknowledges a writer's transactional relationship w ith a reader when
he asserts, " You can't give readers a finished product . . . any more than a
playwright can send a live play through the mail," and freewriting assumes
the influence of language upon an individual writer: "You stand out of the
way and let the words be chosen by the sequence of the words themselves"
(W riting

315,

16).

Similar

to

Elbow,

Donald

Murray

describes

9
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the

intersubjective quality of composing through his concept of a w riter's "other
self" that anticipates the possible public responses to a text (Learning

167).

Stephen Fishman and Lucille McCarthy recently have asserted that students
in an "expressivist" classroom do collaborate to a much greater degree than
Berlin ever recognizes ("Com m unity" 71).
Because

his theories of composing have been read reductively and

dismissively, Peter Elbow opposes the label "expressivism." He considers it
to be a "hostilely motivated" term, originating with those who seem to want
to "wipe out" writing process theorists ("Uses" 69 and 76, n. 16). 1 also reject
the "expressivist" label as reductive, hence ahistorical, so I refer to Elbow and
Murray as writing process theorists. 1 distinguish them from Linda Row er
and John Hayes by referring to the latter as cognitive process theorists, a term
taken from one of Flower and

Hayes' major articles entitled "A Cognitive

Process Theory of W riting." 3 Bizzell, like Berlin, faults both w riting process
and cognitive process theorists for being "inner-directed," m eaning they
concentrate

on a

student's

presum ed

capabilities.

Bizzell instead advocates

innate

and

universal

language

"outer-directed" social theories that

consider a student's language-thinking capacities to be fostered by, and
functioning within, particular discourse comm unities ("Cognition" 215).
These "outer-directed"
conflicts

between,

theorists emphasize the influences of, and

discrete

discourse

cognitivist theorists m inim ize.

comm unities

which

the

process

and

They, therefore, deem no w riter

a

modernist island, capable of detached, objective contemplation of the world
beyond the self.
Because of their rejection of modernist assumptions, social theorists
like Berlin, Bizzell, and Bartholomae are often labeled as postm odernists or
poststructuralists. 4 As the term

postm odernism

itself suggests,

10
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these

theorists have shifted composition 'aw ay7 from more individualistic concepts
of a w riter who supposedly uses language for self-expression.

Yet at this

supposed critical distance 'after7 writing process and cognitive process
theories, these theorists still position them selves by referring 'back' to the
rejected beliefs of m odernism found in their reductive criticisms.

Like their

predecessors, these postm odern theorists have positioned themselves in
relation to w hat they are moving away from as much as towards, and this
retrospective critique has led contemporary composition into w hat another
leading social theorist, Lester Faigley, term s the "postm odern
(Fragments

20).

This

apparently

unresolvable

individual's agency, the ability of a speaker or

problem

impasse"

involves

an

w riter to create and assert

certain beliefs. This impasse, as its etymology suggests, leaves a postmodern
w riter in a theoretical 'blind alley' from which no advance, or even regress,
seems possible.

The Postm odern Impasse
Postm odernists oppose the autonom ous individual of m odernism
because, as structuralists and poststructuralists, they believe the individual is
situated w ithin prior discourses. They indicate this opposition by referring to
the 'in dividual' as the 'subject7
postm odern
meaning of
jectus
oppose,

(Berlin

"Poststructuralism "

18). The

usage of this word, however, often conflates its original
a subordinate person (from

the Latin snbjectus: sub - under;

- thrown) with the concept of the sovereign self it is supposed to
as

in

"poststructuralists

have systematically

deconstructed

all

received notions of the subject" (Burke 106, iVIartin Jay qtd. by Burke 106). This
paradoxical usage

typifies the complexity of a postm odern subject being

situated in prior discourses.

11

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

When the subject is situated "among many competing discourses that
precede the subject," Faigley cautions, "the notion of 'participation' becomes
problematic in its implication that the subject can control its location and
moves within a discourse" (Fragments 226-27).

This questioning of an

individual's ability to control his or her position within various discourses
raises the perplexing issue of agency for postm odern theorists.

Unlike

Kenneth Burke's use of this term in his theory of the pentad w here it refers to
the means used to achieve a desired end, agency, for postm odernists, relates
to their concern whether individuals have any control over their means and
ends. As Rebecca Howard explains,

It has become commonplace for rhetoricians to engage in the question
of agency in the subject . . . . Can w'riters control their w riting processes
or are their writing processes - - and indeed the writers themselves - constructed by their cultural settings? (349)
In his aw ard winning Fragments

o f Rationalitij, Faigley reluctantly assumes

the latter, at least, in theory. And, because he assumes "the subject is an effect
rather than the cause of discourse," the postm odern concept of subjectivity
becomes a debilitating pun (9). An individual w riter must be conceived as an
object

subjected'

to

the

dom inant,

and

dom inating,

determ ine the beliefs formed and asserted (Fragments

discourses

that

139). Yet, as Faigley

himself admits, this theoretical conclusion is contradicted by his ow n reading
of several students' essays in which he grants them some agency.

After

Faigley analyzes their texts, he asserts these students are "more aw are of how
agency can be constructed from m ultiple subject positions than are many
theorists" (224).

Because postm odern theory cannot adequately account for

the practices of successful writers, contemporary composition instructors face
an impasse, a blind alley’ from which we currently know not w here to turn

12
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in theory or in practice. The current confusion over a writer’s relationship
w ith language

must be resolved because it has created the pedagogical

extremes of a postmodern denial of student writers’ thoughts and an
uncritical acceptance of their every word.

Agency and Authority in the Postm odern Classroom
Because they locate individual writers w ithin prior discourse,
and

Faigley

Berlin have made some troubling assum ptions about w hat composition

students can, and should do, with language. Some instructors, like Faigley,
revel in the fact that their students are inscribed by language, and they
celebrate

this

inscription

instructors, such as

without

sufficiently

questioning

it.

O ther

Berlin, revile the influence of the dom inant discourses

upon students, and they oppose the hegemonic culture with revolutionary
alternatives.

Unfortunately, these postm odern practices

have questionable

consequences for the agency of students and the authority of the instructor.
To oppose the foundational concepts of language as neutral and of
individuals as autonomous, Faigley advocates the "the achieved utopia of the
networked classroom," but the actual results are far from ideal (Fragments
163).

As explained in Fragments, Faigley replaces the conventional class

discussion with electronic mail exchanges to produce a collective text. These
fragm entary,

simultaneous

comments,

Faigley

contends,

disrupt

conventions of turn-taking and topical coherence" that he

"the

incorrectly

associates with all oral discussions (168). By claim ing that every conventional
classroom discussion consists of a linear pattern of teacher to student and
student to teacher, Faigley tries to ascribe the success of some of these
exchanges to their medium, the electronic forum (180). He, however, ignores
the productive, decentered dialogues that the best conventional classroom
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conversations can foster in order to advance his electronic alternative.
The transcript of the first exchange concerning gender roles shows that
some students do

"negotiate . . . [different] m eanings with other students"

and "try on and exchange identities . . . even from one message to the next"
(185, 191, and see 170-78).

Yet the computer netw ork cannot be entirely

responsible for these successes if it does not preclude other failures. In what
Faigley initially terms his "worst" computer conversation, his students resist
any m eaningful discussion then resort to intolerant invective and inflexible
opinions in order to avoid
(192-7).

critical thought and constructive engagement

One student, self-identified as "armpit,"

comments, "isn't this so

fun. let's not talk about the reading!!!" and another denounces a classmate as
"a FEMALE cha[u]vinist pig" (193, 195). Despite the claims to the contrary,
this utopia has not been achieved. Faigley frankly adm its the failure of these
students and others to negotiate their different discursive practices, but his
zeal for these com puter conversations makes him lapse into a

relativism

which underm ines his students' agency (189).
Not only do these students fail to develop the agency with which to
articulate, defend, and modify their beliefs, but their instructor denies his
own agency as well by

abrogating

his authority.

Rather than address his

students' unproductive and even objectionable discussion or take some credit
for the much better exchange by another class, Faigley dem urs, "I cannot
defend these labels [for the w orst’ and 'best' discussions] because in both
classes students claimed and used classroom space for their ow n purposes"
(197)!

The

postm odern concept of language as

endless signification

apparently makes Faigley leery of interrupting the flashing display of
electronic messages.

He tolerates the unexamined opinions of students like

those identified by the self-selected pseudonyms of "A. Hitler" and "armpit"
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(172, 193). He also overlooks the crucial catalysts provided by a teaching
assistant, JoAnn Campbell, during the "best" conversation; her provocative
questions stimulate several of the the most productive exchanges (169,178).
By his failure to question the students' objectionable assum ptions and
provoke insightful responses, Faigley fulfills his own postm odern skepticism
about individual agency.
Through this enervating relativism, Faigley's netw orked classroom
duplicates a weakness found w ithin some writing process theories. Like Ken
Macro rie in one of his first texts entitled Up taught, Faigley encourages "the
sensational rush over the considered response" as James Vopat prescientlv
w arned at the inception of the m odern writing process m ovem ent (42). This
common problem again suggests that writing process and postmodern
theories are not as m utually exclusive

as Berlin, and Faigley himself,

contend. 5
Rather than abrogate a postm odern composition instructor's authority,
James Berlin aggrandizes it as he tries to resolve the im passe over agency in
practice.

In Berlin's experim ental course, his postm odern assumptions

require an instructor to ultim ately dom inate the students, and their passivity
prevents the developm ent of any agency as writers. "Given the ubiquitous
role of discourse in hum an affairs," Berlin reasons, "instructors cannot be
content to focus exclusively on teaching the production of academ ic texts . . . .
We must take as our province the production and reception of semiotic
codes" ("Poststructuralism" 24). As explained in "Postructuralism , Cultural
Studies, and the Composition Classroom,” Berlin "refigures English studies
along the lines of cultural studies" by engaging his students in collaborative
learning sequences (26).

Using the principles of deconstruction, Berlin

teaches his students to identify the ever shifting binary oppositions within
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texts and to consider the consequences of privileging, for example, masculine
over feminine in a tacit hierarchy (see 26-32).
Through this identification of these implicit values, Berlin hopes,
"students who can dem ystify the subtle devices of persuasion in these
cultural codes will be motivated to begin" participating in the developm ent of
"more democratic and personally humane economic, social, and political
arrangem ents" (27). Although Berlin explicitly states, "students do not always
subm it to these codes," he conceives of the dom inant discourses as an
oppressive obstacle which students must overcome (30).
students to "challenge

He expects his

the dom inant ideological formations" and to "resist

and negotiate these hegemonic [cultural] codes" (26, 27).

W hen most of

these students' experiences are considered products of the dom inant ideology,
this rhetoric of resistance, however, leads to a postmodern form of paralysis.
The desired resistance against the hegemonic culture deprives these students
of enough background know ledge w ith which to consider specific assertions.
As these students are deprived the necessary background for individual
agency, Berlin believes the postm odern instructor

must "problem atize" the

cultural codes that "students bring to college by placing their signifying
practices against alternatives" (31).

Alan France, another postm odern

composition theorist, makes explicit that these alternatives are provided by
the instructor; he advocates the use of "principled critical intervention" to
correct a student's naive view concerning, for example, the purposes of
im prisonm ent

(550). This

im position

by

a supposedly

neutral,

non

authoritarian instructor, however, interferes with the continuing process of
learning for the sake of an im m ediate product. When Berlin and France
dem and students challenge the dom inant ideology,

these students often

resist not the privileged discourses, but their composition instructor.
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According to Bizzell, Berlin’s experimental course fails to achieve its
stated goals. When Berlin, for example, "asks students to deconstruct
dom inant ideologies on relations between the sexes . . . . [they] hold firmly to
the ideologies they are supposed to question. [Both female and male students)
defend prostitution as a wom an's right to make money any way she sees fit"
(Bizzell "Beyond" 670)!
postm odern

pedagogy

Like Bizzell,
is too

I believe the bitter medicine of this

much for Berlin’s students to swallow.

Resistance against presumably oppressive discursive practices requires most
students to doubt too much of their previous knowledge. As Bizzell explains,
many students have already experienced this pervasive skepticism "in the
[mass m edia's] hip sm irk of passive detachment . . . and they d o n 't like it"
("Beyond" 671). Quoting Jackson Lears, she adds, students dislike this
postm odern suspension of belief because, on some level, many already
com prehend

the consequences of uncommitted skepticism: "blase self

containm ent" (qtd. in "Beyond" 671).
As these postm odern instructors abrogate or aggrandize their authority,
their students have difficulty developing the agency with which one asserts,
examines, defends, and revises one's beliefs.

Because of these pedagogical

problems, other postm odern and feminist theorists have addressed and
begun to resolve this impasse over agency. These partial solutions mean that
this quandary, in both theory and practice, can and should be avoided.

Some New (and Old) Directions beyond the Impasse
To avoid this impasse over agency, the premises of postmodernism
that created it need to be reconsidered. In contrast to the dichotomv assumed
by structuralist and most poststructuralist theorists, Mikhail Bakhtin creates
an alternative, dialectical relationship between society and the individual. As
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Don Bialostosky explains in "Liberal Education, Writing, and the Dialogic
Self," Bakhtin's concept of the dialogic self describes an individual who can
can develop the agency of forming "internally persuasive discourse" which
Bakhtin distinguishes from "authoritative discourse."

The latter discourse

creates a distance between rhetor and audience; it is to be received and
repeated w ithout question.

Internally persuasive discourse, in contrast, is

neither self-validating, nor self-generated.
someone else's . . . . it organizes masses of

It

is instead, "half-ours, half-

our words from w ithin

not rem ain in an isolated and static condition . . . .
interanim ating relationships with new contexts"

and does

it enters into

(Bakhtin qtd. Bialostosky

15). This discourse creates contact between speaker and listener, writer and
reader; it responds to what has been or may be said by others.
In contrast to postm odern theories

of discourse in which

they are

believed to "contain within them all the possibilities of utterances," Bakhtin’s
concept of heteroglossia gives an individual voice only their "occasions and
provocations" (Bialostosky 19, 20). O ur identities form and continue forming
through our dialogue with others and among our ow n varied discourses;
thus, the self is dialogic. As an individual deliberately selects and tests "new
[discursive] ways of seeing and saying," agency can be developed (17). In order
to develop agency, student writers need to be protected tem porarily from the
cacophony of the competing viewpoints, lest they become overwhelm ed by
authoritative discourse. Vet to be able to participate in the ongoing dialogue,
student writers need to listen to "some sample of its voices;" their voices
depend upon "whom they have heard of and whom they have heard o u r
(21, 14). Yet Bakhtin's theory of "internally persuasive discourse"

does not

offer a complete account of individual agency because he assumes that every
voice is equally available for the student writer to hear.

Bakhtin does
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acknowledge the ideological import of discourse, but he does not address the
m arginalization of certain discourses exam ined by Michel Foucault in his
historical studies of discursive practices and power relations. The dialogic self
cannot anticipate and respond to voices unheard.
To hear voices silenced by the dom inant discourses, the radical
educators Ira Shor, Henry Giroux, and Nan Elsasser advocate Paulo Freire's
theory of critical literacy.

This literacy program affirms the students' own

experiences and deconstructs the discursive practices that marginalize certain
voices.

Its goal is critical consciousness, the awareness that language

constitutes, not merely names, a particular cultural reality’ and each person
is a dialectical participant in the existing social order and can be an agent in its
reform. In Freire's native Brazil, the peasants in this program learned they
had the agency with which to voice their desires for democratic equality.

In

the United States, Linda Shaw Finlay and Valerie Faith have adapted Freire's
critical literacy to help underachieving college students overcome their
unproductive assum ptions about language and writing. These students
developed a critical awareness of their participation and potential agency
within the discursive formation of their cultural 'reality' (75). Yet this
pedagogical success surpasses its theoretical origin.

For Freire, the fruition of

his students' critical literacy comes w hen they realize the dom inant, capitalist
ideology is a distortion of the true reality revealed by Marxism (Bizzell
"Marxist" 64). Yet for Finlay and Faith, their students' agency is not measured
by their comm itm ent to Marxism.
A third and final example of a partial resolution of the postm odern
impasse is the feminist theorist Dale Bauer's revision of postm odern agency
to include more than the resistance theorized by Foucault and sought in
practice by Berlin.

In addition to critiquing the dom inant discourse and
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conceiving of alternatives, Bauer believes students need to to learn "how to
belong, how to identify, as well as how to resist" if they are to accept
alternatives, such as her own feminist principles (391).

Based on Kenneth

Burke's rhetorical theory, Bauer encourages her students to engage in
"identificatory readings" of feminist literary texts (391). Through this process
of identification, an individual faces a decisive confrontation between two
previously accepted values, and Bauer hopes, an individual learns to adopt
the alternatives conceived through critical consciousness. Yet by disavowing
any closure to her feminist composition course, Bauer mitigates the agency
she theorizes and teaches.

She claims, "These classes, indeed perhaps

feminist pedagogy and rhetoric in general, end ambivalently: these disrupted
values

or assum ptions are not occasions for reconstituting consciousness

into clear categories of . . . good and bad politics" (394). Like Faigley in his
networked classroom, Bauer lapses into an enervating relativism that
precludes much of a collaborative effort for greater gender equality against
continuing patriarchal dominance; she hesitates before imposing her desired
alternatives w hich Berlin risks.
A lthough each of these reconsiderations of
avoids some of the theoretical premises

postm odernism impasse

of the current impasse (the

dichotomy of society and the individual, the silencing of alternative voices,
and the paralyzing emphasis on resistance), none creates a complete account
of agency.

N or does there seem to be any recourse to previous composition

theories of agency.

If Berlin's and Bizzell's criticisms of writing process and

cognitive process theories are accepted, then any possible regress away from
this impasse along these previous approaches has been blocked. Fortunately,
an even older blueprint of the postm odern impasse already exists, one that
will allow contem porary theorists to recover that which is valuable from
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dism issed writing process and cognitive process theories as well as redirect
com position studies.

"From that which is rejected"
Postmodernist theorists -- as they currently influence contemporary
composition -- cannot direct any advance beyond the impasse over agency
because they "take [their| clew . . . from that which is rejected" rather than
"positively and constructively . . . [developing theirj own philosophy" (Dewey
Experience and Education 20 and see Newkirk more 187). In Experience and
Education, John Dewey specifically offers this caution to progressive educators
who never implemented fully, or even seemed to understand completely, his
pedagogical principles.

When considered in the larger context of Dewey's

pragm atic philosophy, this criticism reveals the source of the postm odern
impasse.

As these social theorists critique the modernist author specifically

and foundationalism in general, they have "take [their] clew . . . from that
which is [to be] rejected."

Deweyan pragmatism, in contrast, can provide a

theoretical account of individual agency because this philosophy has been
"positively and constructively" developed.
Until

recently,

the

academic

and

political

m arginalization

of

pragm atism after Dewey's death has prevented many contemporary readers
from realizing the full relevance of this non-foundational philosophy. Yet,
like the literary theorist Giles Gunn, I believe that Deweyan pragm atism will
prove to be the "most intellectually resilient American response to

the

quicksands and carapaces of cultural postmodernism" as well as, I will add,
the impasse over agency w ithin contemporary composition (7). Through his
pragm atist reconstruction of foundational philosophies, Dewey identifies and
replaces the false dualisms of society and the individual, language and
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thought,

and

structure

and

agency

which

structuralist, and postmodernist thinkers.

have

trapped

modernist,

By reconstructing these false

dualism s, this dialectical philosophy provides a coherent conceptual system
that can guide contemporary composition beyond the postm odern impasse.
This

redirection

of contemporary

composition

based

on

Deweyan

pragm atism is already underway - although very quietly.
In 1980, Janet Emig identified Dewey as one of several seminal
thinkers whose "tacit tradition[sl" w ithin composition needed to be fully
articulated (Michael Polyani qtd. on 150).

Thomas Newkirk has continued

this gradual realization by asserting, "Dewey articulated many of the cardinal
principles of the writing process" (more

206).

Newkirk

explains the

following pragm atist precepts using num erous quotations of Dewey: "the
constructive model of thought; the primacy of experience; the social nature of
learning; the relationship of classroom learning to democratic values," and
these principles are related, by a few references, to James Britton, Donald
M urray, Donald Graves, C. H. Knoblauch and Lil Brannon (m ore

206).

W ithout further analysis of these w riting process advocates, this insightful
explication of Dewey's relevance, however, has been overwhelmed by critics
of w riting process theorists.

This dissertation, therefore, will redress these

criticisms as part of its larger project to redirect contemporary composition.
Recently, Stephen Fishman has extended N ew kirk's careful reading of
Dewey with a detailed analysis of Elbow's writing process theory.
N ew kirk,

Fishman believes that

Like

"the Deweyan tradition" provides the

"philosophic roots" of m odem writing process theories ("Explicating" 316). 6
After

examining Dewey's conceptions of education, community, and

perception, he applies these concepts to the example of one student named
Ramona engaging in peer response and multiple draft revision.

Fishman's
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article and

other recent essays

co-authored with Lucille McCarthy do not

articulate, a n d probably cannot w ithin the limited length of journal articles,
Dewey's thorough non-foundational reconstruction of philosophy and its
problematic terms.

This dissertation, therefore, will extend the efforts by

Emig, N ew kirk, Fishman, and others to articulate the tacit tradition of
Deweyan pragm atism within w riting process theories.
I consider the postm odern impasse of agency to be one of those
prim arily theoretical problems that, I hope, will soon be seen in retrospect
with incredulity. This problem will some day seem as distant and ridiculous
as the apocryphal story of three Cartesian philosophers trying to determ ine
the num ber of teeth in a horse’s mouth.

The first two were devout

rationalists, faithfully trying to deduce the correct num ber from various first
principles.

The third, a more secular character, was looking out a window

disinterestedly until he saw an actual horse in the courtyard.

Suddenly he

suggested, "Why don’t we open the horse’s m outh and count the teeth
inside?"

The first two Cartesians quickly dismissed this absurd suggestion

and returned to their deductions from absolute principles.
third

philosopher

soon lapsed

into

unknown

reveries,

Although the
the

inductive

thinking based on empirical details represented by his suggestion was to
transform Europe during the

Enlightenment.

Yet w ithin this adm ittedly

apocryphal story, the first two rationalists cannot conceive of actually
counting the horse's teeth even after it has been suggested to them.
As show n in this introduction, the
postm odern
composition.

impasse

does

influence

Like the rationalism

the

theoretical problem of the
practices

of

of these apocryphal

contemporary
philosophers,

postm odern theory influences the problems considered significant and the
solutions deem ed conceivable by many contemporary composition theorists.
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It is my hope that this study w ill lead not only to a better historical
understanding of composition's recent past, but in the spirit of Deweyan
reconstruction of knowledge, this project will also look towards this
discipline's future beyond the postmodern impasse. A future, I want to
demonstrate, in which the supposedly contradictory pedagogies of writing
process and social epistemic instruction can be even more than "good
neighbors." Using Deweyan pragmatism, I plan to dismantle rather than
rebuilt again the divisive boundary between these two pedagogies so student
writers can learn to achieve greater non-foundational agency.
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CHAPTER ONE NOTES
1. Taxonomic terms can make useful distinctions. For example, James
Britton and his co-authors created the categories of expressive, poetic, or
transactional w riting to serve as "a possible means tow ards [greater)
understanding" (198). The reduction, however, of these distinctions to
formulaic assignments —explicitly opposed by the authors —dem onstrates the
perils of classification (198). Reductive labels are often applied w hen a new
theory of w riting is advanced. For example, when Daniel Fogarty w anted to
trace the "roots of a new rhetoric" in 1959, he coined the term "current
traditional" which many have applied to the nineteenth century theories of
Barrett Wendell, John Genung, and A. S. Hill (118). Hill certainly seems to
deserve this label when he does not require rhetoric to ”fum is[h] a person
with something to say . . . [only] how best to say [it]" (The Principles o f
Rhetoric qtd. in Young 29). Yet Hill also defies this categorization when he
insists that students should not "hide [their] poverty of thought in [the]
finish of style" (Our English 89). He seems positively progressive w hen he
laments the "dreary" language of themes and advocates self-selected topics so
students can "put forth their full powers" in "free and natural expression"
(96, 93). The 'current-traditional' category not only treats Hill, Genung, and
Wendell in a reductive manner, but as Lucille Schultz also objects, this label
has obscured the diversity of nineteenth century writing instruction (10).
2. In The Making o f Meaning (1981), Ann Berthoff warns, 'T eaching process
does not require that we ignore the product, only that we see it as a dynamic
result, a coming into being" (22). In more than stories
(1989) , Thomas
Newkirk similarly asserts that although Donald M urray "has w ritten that we
cannot infer the process from the p ro d u c t,' a pig from a sausage.' My guess is
that we do this all the time" (180).
3. In contrast to Berlin, Susan Jarratt considers the advances and the
complexities of
w riting process theories in her article "Feminism and
Composition: The Case for Conflict" published in Contending With Words.
4. Like its theory of meaning, the term postm odernism itself is is unstable
and heteroglossic. As Lester Faigley explains so well in the introduction of
Fragments o f Rationality, postmodernism can refer to three metadiscourses
about 1) literature and art, 2) philosophy, and 3) the social history of
capitalism (6). W ithin contemporary composition, postm odernism is often
used as the preferred synonym for poststructuralism, yet postm odernism is a
broader term that includes both the structuralist and poststrucuralist critiques
of m odernism (see chapter one).
25
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5. Faigley’s abrogated authority and his students' attenuated agency stem in
part from his conflation of the netw orked classroom's collective text and the
"multiple agencies and origins" of discourse identified by D errida ("Freud"
226). This collective text w ritten by m u ltip le students is not the same as the
"overlapping and com peting discourses" in which each student is situated
(16). Thus, the technology of Faigley’s electronic discussions can no more
guarantee each student will confront and critique their fragm ented and
contradictory subjectivity than a stimulating conventional classroom
conversation can prevent it. In his otherwise penetrating survey of of
postmodernism, Faigley fails to question the paradox of the networked
classroom: in lieu of
direct oral interactions, Faigley advocates the
technological separation of subjects because it fosters more hum an contact
betw een them.
In a subsequent chapter, Faigley includes the following quotation by the
postm odernist thinker Jean Baudrillard: "Just look at the child sitting in
front of his com puter at school; do you think he has been m ade interactive,
opened up to the world? Child and machine have been m erely joined
together in an integrated circuit" (qtd. on 209). Yet he fails to consider this
telling quotation in relation to his own networked classroom. Although
Faigley connects postm odernism to late capitalism's hyperreality, his
enthusiasm for these electronic discussions is uncharacteristically uncritical
and apolitical. For example, he also states, "Networked w riting displaces the
m odernist conception of writing as hard work aimed at producing an
enduring object. Acts of netw orked writing are most often quickly produced,
quickly consumed, and quickly discarded" without questioning the
desirability of this postm odern perspective (191).
6.
Fishman also notes recent studies by John Trimbur, D avid Russell, and
Louise W. Phelps that examine Deweyan pragmatism as one of several
influences on contem porary composition studies.
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CHAPTER II

BEYOND THE POSTMODERN IMPASSE:
REJECTING THE CLUES OF FOUNDATIONALISM
'T h ere is alw ays the danger in a new m ovem ent that in rejecting the
aim s and methods of that it would supplant, it may develop
its principles negatively . . . . Then it takes its clew . . . from
that which is rejected instead of from the constructive
developm ent of its own philosophy." - - John Dewey
T h e concept of the author is never more alive than
when pronounced dead.” - - Sedn Burke
Like a hiker backtracking to find a missed turn, contemporary
composition theorists need to retrace the steps that have brought them to the
postm odern impasse over agency.

As structuralist and poststructuralist

theorists have critiqued foundationalism, they have identified the theoretical
path they no longer want to follow, yet they have been unable to reach a
tenable theory of non-foundational agency.
thinkers

as

postm odern

anti-foundationalists.

1, therefore, refer to these
The

findings

incomplete critique too often have been repeated w ithout
rejected out of hand.

of their

question or

Roland Barthes' seminal structuralist essay, for

example, has "been accepted unreflexively [by its supporters] . . . without
[having his] argum ents . . . held up to any critical scrutiny," or "it has seldom
provoked more than derisory dismissal from its opponents" (Burke 21). A
careful and rigorous retracing of the structuralist and

poststructuralist

critiques of foundationalism by Roland Barthes, Jacques Derrida, and Michel

Foucault, however, will reveal their m issteps tow ards the postmodern
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impasse and the possible pragm atist recourse beyond this predicament.
Structuralist and postststructuralist theorists have underm ined the
foundationalist concept of agency by questioning the foundational concepts of
reality, knowledge, and language upon which it depends. Foundationalists,
from Plato to John Locke, have believed that thought precedes language
because thought is assum ed to be a direct and unmediated apprehension of an
antecedent and

ultimate reality. The mind, Richard Rorty explains, is

conceived according to an ocular analogy. Just as the body's eye perceives
physical appearances, the mind is believed to 'see' this prior reality (38). If a
knower passively perceives
being

an antecedent reality, then it is not altered by

known, and knowledge is not affected by its expression.

represents

Thought

reality, and

language represents thought. According to this

representational theory,

language is a neutral, transparent m edium for the

expression of thought.

A w ord in language is believed to have one-to-one

correspondence with an aspect of reality.
A lthough m odernist writers, such as Ernest Hemingway, doubt the
foundational reality has stable order, they still believe an individual is capable
of autonom ous, objective contempla-ion of the chaotic w orld beyond the self.
For example, in A Moveable Feast, Hemingway presents

himself as the

expatriate in Paris who writes in unheated garrets or in uncrow ded cafes.
The scene of his writing is one of physical isolation, and each day it begins by
"writ[ing| the truest sentence that you know . . . . startjingl w ith the first true
simple declarative sentence" (12).

The problem with this depiction of

composing is that it makes "transcription a synecdoche of writing" (Brodkey
398). It treats one part, the writing down of words, as though it represents the
whole of composing; it suppresses the social aspects of composing that
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influence a w riter even as he or she is physically isolated from others. Based
on these foundational conceptions of reality, thought, and language, student
writers have been instructed to 'think then write,' and the composing process
has been lim ited to thinking, perhaps outlining, then writing.
Structuralist theorists, such as Ferdinand de Saussure and Claude LeviStrauss, have rejected these foundational concepts and have sought to
supplant them with postm odern alternatives. De Saussure, for example, has
challenged the assumed transparency and the neutrality of language by
reconceiving words as arbitrary signs. According to structuralism, these signs
consist of a signifier and a signified, and they function within a contextual
network. Each sign is meaningful because of its difference, its contrast w ith
other signs. A spoken or written signifier suggests a signified based on these
differential relationships, not because of

its direct correspondence to a

particular aspect of foundational reality.

Levi-Strauss

has analyzed the

systematic pattern of oppositions found in m yths, narratives, and languages.
These binary

oppositions, he argues, not only influence the assertion of

meaning but also the very development of m eaning, consciousness, and
identity. A writer, therefore, does not simply express an original idea after an
acute perception of reality.

Developed in opposition to

foundationalism,

structuralism has successfully criticiqued the previous concept of agency.
Unfortunately, it also leads to the current impasse as Jacques Lacan and
Roland Barthes dem onstrate.
Using Freud's analysis of dreams, Jacques Lacan denies that
reflexive agency can be achieved.

self

As shown by dream s, language involves

the condensation and displacem ent of m eaning on an unconscious level. The
speaking

subject enters

a social

position

through

language,
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yet

the

unconscious distortions of meaning
critically self-examined.

prevent this

location

from being

The translated title of a 1957 article by Lacan

epitomizes the problem atic implications of the structuralist critique: 'T h e
Agency of the Letter in the Unconsciousness, or Reason Since Freud" because,
w ithin this title, agency is not even ascribed to the individual, but to the
"letter[s|" of language.

This postmodern skepticism towards individual

consciousness

absolute

becomes

when

Roland

Barthes

executes

this

m odernist theory of authorship in his seminal essay appropriately entitled
T h e Death of the A uthor.’’
Because he assum es the structuralist axiom that "it is language which
speaks, not the author," Barthes' argum ent ultimately goes astray,

yet this

misdirection suggests an alternative premise essential to a tenable theory of
non-foundational agency (50). To execute the m odernist author upon whom
a conventional critic depends for textual closure, Barthes employs a twofold
argum ent. First, he

"su p p re sses] the author in favor of writing" meaning

language, and second, he ”restor[es] . . . the reader's place" (50). To suppress
the modernist concept of authorship, Barthes asserts,
We now know that a text consists not of a line of w ords, releasing a single
theological’ [or absolutel meaning (the ’message’ of the author-God), but
of a m ulti-dimensional space in which are m arried and contested several
writings, none of which is original: the text is a fabric of quotations,
resulting from a thousand sources of culture . . . . [a w riter’s! sole power is
to mingle writings. (52-53)
Through this structuralist reconception of the text, Barthes reduces the
significance the m odernist author.

If "a text consists of m ultiple writings,’’

then a writer merely quotes and "mingles" many prior "sources of culture"
(54).

Through this reversal of the foundational precedence of the individual

know er/w riter to language, Barthes tries to restore the reader's relevance to
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textual interpretaton.

He argues,

the

"site

where

this

m ultiplicity

is

collected . . . is not the author, as has hitherto been claimed, but the reader '
(54).

It is the reader/ critic w ho creates an interpretation. Yet as a critique of

the m odernist author, of definitive textual criticism, and ultim ately, of
foundationalism , Barthes' argum ent "take[s its] clew" from the foundational
conception of writers and readers as two distinct entities - only one of whom
produces meaning. It is this foundational clue that leads Barthes astray.
When Barthes tries to de-em phasize the privileged writer, he assum es
he "must reverse the myth: the birth of the reader m ust be requited by the
death of the Author'" (55). Because Barthes has not rejected the foundational
conception of writers and readers, he tries to "reverse" the hierarchy which
privileges the writer. He overlooks New Criticism's previous m ethodological
exclusion of the author, such as by the intentional fallacy, and creates an
om inpotent author capable of absolute meaning. Then Barthes can employ
the structuralist conception of language to execute the author and restore the
reader. As Sean Burke notes, Barthes "does not so much destroy the 'AuthorGod', but participates in its construction. He must create a king w orthy of the
killing" (26). This argum ent, however, depends upon Barthes’ flawed analogy
between an author and an om nipotent God.
Unlike the Christian concept of God, there are alternative theories of
authorship w ith which it is possible "without contradiction, to conceive of
authors . . . who do not hold a univocal mastery over their texts," such as
Mikhail Bakhtin's dialogic concept of the self

(Burke 25). Yet Barthes does

not consider any of these alternatives, and this failure has a tragic effect on his
stated desire of seeing the reader reborn. When Barthes wields the stucturalist
concept of language to kill the "Author-God," he announces, the reader is the
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very space in which are inscribed, w ithout any of them being "lost, all of the
citations out of which a writing is made;

the unity of a text is not in its

origins but in its destination, but this destination can no longer be personal ;
the reader is . . . only that someone who holds . . . all of the tracesfrom which
writing is constituted" (54). Yet, due to the structuralist priority of language
to an individual, the reader which Barthes hopes to deliver from the grasp of
the "Author-God" is stillborn. Instead of being the passive recipient of a
m odernist's author text,

Barthes' reader is a receptive destination point for

the system of language and its individual utterance.
By placing both the w riter and the reader within a prior language
system, Barthes denies both any agency; each becomes a passive conduit of
discourse. Barthes' misstep reveals that an adequate account of agency must
include a transactional conception of writers and readers as well as a
Bakhtinian dialectic between these individuals and their society's language. If
Barthes had considered another, less divine, concept of authorship, he could
have conceived of a collaborative relationship between a w riter and a reader
which grants both limited agency within a language system. Yet in order to
conceive of such collaborative agency, Barthes cannot accept "that which is [to
bej rejected."
As
Foucault,

postmodernist thinkers, such as Jacques Derrida and

Michel

have furthered the structuralist critique of foundationalism , their

partial successes and ultimate failures again can be retraced in order to avoid
the postm odern impasse.

Foucault furthers his predecessors' criticisms of

m odernism by subjecting structuralism itself to discursive analysis.

He

realizes one's "terms and concepts . . . are always bound up w ith the signifying
processes [they set| out to analyse" (Norris 9). Foucault, therefore, analyzes
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discursive practices as cultural products rather than as the universal system
imagined by structuralists.

If one's discursive practices are historically

contingent, then individual knowledge is even less of an direct description of
foundational reality. Despite this provocative revision of structuralism and
its critique of foundationalism,
have not

these two leading

postm odernist thinkers

"deve!op[ed their own] principles," as Dewey warns, "positively

and constructively" enough to avert

contemporary composition’s impasse

over agency.

Jacques Derrida and Absolute Absence
Like Freire's critical literacy, D errida's deconstructive strategy tries to
make resistance possible against the dom inant ideology.

The strategy of

deconstruction begins with the identification of binary oppositions; for
example,

D errida

deconstructs

foundationalism

by

examining

opposition of presence and absence" (G ram m atology 143).
foundationalism

as

"the

metaphysics

of

presence"

"the

He refers to

because

in

this

epistemology, one's inherent identity or 'self-present-ness' is assumed to be
dem onstrated by one's individual consciousness or 'inner voice.' This initial
assum ption of one's self-presence leads to the parallel assumption of

a

foundational reality w hen the apparent relationship between identity and
voice is transferred to that of reality and m ind. Just as the individual self is
assumed to be manifested by consciousness, so too is an absolute reality
believed to be revealed by ones thoughts (Crowley Teacher’s

2-3).

After identifying this binary opposition between presence and absence,
Derrida employs the second tactic of deconstruction; he reintroduces the
marginalized supplem ent which, in this case, is writing.

Within

33

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

the

foundational metaphysics of presence, w riting is believed to be

the mere

transcription of speech which, in turn, is considered the expression of an
individual's prior thoughts. Yet Derrida warns, "w riting is dangerous from
the moment that representation there [in writingl claims to be presence and
the sign of the thing in itself' (G ram m atology 144). By "presence," Derrida
means the self-presentation of the author "there" in the text using words
conceived of as "sign[s| of the thing in itself" according to a representational
theory of language.

Writing disrupts the untenable hierarchy of presence

over absence because, Derrida argues, writing functions not through a writer's
presence but by her or his absence.
As Derrida explains in "Signature Event Context,"

his concept of

absence does not just refer to the delayed presence of the reader or the prior
presence of the author in relation to the text (179). Instead he insists, a text
communicates when

"the m ark that [the writerj abandons . . . continues to

produce effects independently of his presence" (177). W riting functions as the
writer disappears into language, for w riting "is a mark w hich remains, which
is not exhausted in the present of its inscription, and which can give rise to an
iteration both in the absence of and beyond the presence of [the author]" (181).
In other w ords, the possible chain of signifiers extends beyond the moment of
a text's composition. Like de Saussure, Derrida conceives language as a
differential netw ork of signs in which signifiers only refer to each other.
Derrida

states, "[language is] a system of differences in which each unit is

constituted in reference to [another signified" ("Discussion" 8). De Saussure s
differential netw ork of signs becomes Derrida’s "differance"

in which he

puns on the m eaning of the French verb "differer" - - to differ' and to defer.’
Language functions not only as signs that differ from each other, but also as
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they defer, or delay, any certainty of meaning.
Using the multiple definitions of the word "communication," Derrida
dem onstrates this "difference" to show a word does not possess one "unique,
univocal, rigorous controllable, and transm ittable" m eaning
172).

("Signature"

Nor does context completely narrow a w ord's "polysemic aspects"

because context itself "is never entirely determ inable" since it is inferred from
the separate, polysemic words that comprise a text (173, 175).

With this

possibility of multiple iterations and endless signification w ithin a nonrepresentational

theory

presence collapses.

of

language,

the

foundational

metaphysics of

A text is not a "transitional m edium of . . . a unified

m eaning” based from an author's presence; w riting does not simply record
the oral expression of a writer's prior thoughts (172). Instead, as Paul Smith
explains,

Derrida considers w riting

to be the

textual site where the

"machinery of language . . . goes on w ithout us . . . any 'I' exists only as a
passive construct of a system of [linguistic] forces" (48).
Similar to Barthes, Derrida reduces individual writers and readers to
passive conduits of discourse so he is a much better critic of foundationalism
than an advocate of non-foundationalism . For he does not offer any account
of the ability of a subject, situated in discourses, to deliberately create, assert,
examine, and m aintain/or m odify meaning.
limits

of

his

anti-foundationalism .

deconstructive theory, Derrida

In

Derrida himself exposes the

response

reverts to such

to

criticisms

of

his

foundational claims of

authorship as being m isinterpreted as though his presence determines
m eaning in order to answer his critics (Dasenbrock 670).
Derrida cannot expalin non-foundational agency because he "take[s his]
clew" from foundationalism’s asertion of a writer's absolute presence.
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In

"Signature Event Context," Derrida

negatively deveops his postm odern

theory as he insists on the absolute absence of readers and writers:
all writing m u s t. . . be capable of functioning in the radical absence of
of every empirically determ ined receiver in g e n eral. . . . W hat holds for
the receiver also holds, for the same reasons, for the sender or producer.
To write is to produce a m ark . . . which [a writer's! disappearence will
not, in principle, hinder in its functioning, offering . . . itself to be read
and rewritten. (180)
Yet this insistence that w riting functions independently of any and all writers
and

readers

precludes

individual agency.

By taking

his clue

from

foundational presence, D errida conceives of "subjectivity as a mere passivity,
a simple conductor of sem antic forces" (Smith 50). Lacking a tenable concept
of hum an age, Derrida's deconstructive theory has been analyzed as a
rigorous critique and an

irrational subversion of Western thought by

Chistopher Norris and Jurgen Habermas respectively.

More moderately,

Richard Rorty deems Derrida to be more of a utopian dream er than a rational
philosopher.

(For

a

lively

exchange,

see

Norris'

"Deconstruction,

Postmodernism and Philosophy: Habermas on Derrida" and Rorty's " "Is
Derrida a Transcendental Philosopher?" in Derrida: A Critical Reader).
In his later writings like "Deconstruction and the O ther,” Derrida
claims not to have killed the author/subject as his structuralist predecessor
Barthes did without remorse.

Derrida contends, 'T o deconstruct the subject

does not mean to deny its existence . . . . [deconstructionI does n o t . . . destroy
the subject; it simply tries to resituate it" (qtd. by Szkudlarek 56). This
resituation, however, does destroy the subject as agent because, as

Smith

objects, "Derrida does not provide ant notion of how hum an agents mediate
the actual proces [of signification] . . . . Derrida's promise of resistance cannot
be fulfilled, simply because he cannot imagine 'w ho' m ight effect the
36
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resistance" (53). By not granting the individual agent even a limited presence,
Derrida risks the relativism that always threatens anti-foundationalism and
appears in Faiglev's postm odern networked classroom.

Although Derrida

partially succeeds as a critic of foundationalism, he ultim ately fails as an
advocate of non-foundationalism .

This partial success and ultimate failure

suggest that deconstructive resistance requires some individual presence if an
adequate account of non-foundational agency is to be achieved.
postmodern colleague Michel Foucault,

Derrida's

over the course of his career, also

struggles to situate the subject within discursive practices w ithout precluding
individual agency. His greater degree of success suggests that the postm odern
impasse is not irresolvable.

Michel Foucault and Discursive Oppression
Like Derrida in his later writings, Foucault, in retrospect, states he has
always been concerned with the subject rather than comm itted to its
elimination. He claims, 'T h e goal of my work . . . has not been to analyze the
phenomena of power . . . . [but] to create a history of the different modes by
which, in our culture, hum an beings have been m ade subjects" ("Subject"
208). A retracing of Foucault's gradual revision of his concept of subjectivity
reveals another crucial m issed turn along the path tow ards the postm odern
impasse.
In his early writings like The Order of Things (1966), Foucault asserts
the structuralist reversal of language before thought which creates the
postmodern impasse.

He predicts, like Barthes, the autonom ous subject "is

in the process of perishing as the being of language continues to shine ever
brighter on

the

horizon"

(Order 386).

1 Foucault,

however,
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quickly

complicates this poststructuralist priority of language and the resulting denial
of agency. In "What is an Author?" (1969), he distinguishes between a writer
and an author by comparing their relationship with that of an author and a
narrator. He states, "It would be just as w rong to equate the author with the
real w riter as to equate him with the fictitious speaker" (270). In contrast to
the living writer, "the author does not precede the works" but is "only a
projection . . .

of the operations that we force texts to undergo" (274, 269).

Formalist critics, for example, analyze authors as well as literary works
according

to

their assumed

theoretical

coherence and

stylistic

unity.

Foucault, therefore, demands, "we must entirely reverse the traditional idea
of the author" by "depriving the su b ject. . . of its role as originator" (274). Yet
as he analyzes "the subject as a variable and complex function of discourse,"
Foucault never again mentions the previously distinguished "real w riter" in
this essay (274).
W hen Foucault does address the role of "the individual . . . who wrote
the text” as distinct from the author function, he begins to differ significantly
from his structuralist predecessors (221).

Unlike Barthes, Foucault argues in

'T he Discourse on Language" (1971), "it w ould be ridiculous to deny the
existence of individuals who write, and invent" even as he critiques "the
founding subject [whol permits us to elide the reality of discourse" (222, 227). 2
Although

Foucault, like Derrida, situates the individual w riter within

discourse, he does not insist that language totally predetermines the subject's
thoughts. As an example of agency, he cites Mendel's ability to disrupt the
discourse of nineteenth century botany and to advance his genetic theory
based on his study of the dom inant and recessive characteristics of peas.
Foucault also mentions the complete incom prehension with w hich other
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nineteenth century botanists responded to M endel's study to demonstrate the
difficulty as well as the possibility of individual agency (224). As Foucault
continues his historical study of discursive practices, he concludes that the
very complexity of m odem societies' invasive powers requires, rather than
precludes, individual agency.
Discursive practices, Foucault explains in T h e Subject and Power”
(1982), "in a given society, are multiple; they are superim posed, they cross,
impose their own limits, sometimes cancel one another out, sometimes
reinforce one another" (224).

These practices are never entirely consistent,

and they actually depend upon constrained individual agency. In contrast to
physical violence that "closes the door on all possibilities,"

Foucault

conceives of discursive pow er as "a total structure of actions brought to bear
upon the possible actions [of the subject)" who reacts according to "a whole
field of responses" (220). Thus, the power of dom inant discourses "includes
an im portant element: freedom. Power is exercised only over free subjects"
(221). Confronted by the m ultiple and inconsistent dem ands of the dom inant
ideology, a subject has some autonomy to determ ine an appropriate response.
Or as he states in The History o f Sexuality, "Discourse transmits and produces
power, it reinforces it, but also undermines and exposes it, renders it fragile
and makes it possible to thw art it" (vol. 1 101). This agency with which an
individual responds to and possibly thw arts discursive power implies a
positive concept of freedom, meaning the freedom to act.

In contrast, a

negative conception of freedom stresses freedom from external
(Szkudlarek 42).

constraints

Yet as Foucault tries to explain an individual's resistance

within yet against discourse, he implies a negative concept of freedom which
blocks his own path tow ards postmodern agency.
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In "The Discourse on Language" and "The Subject and Power,"
Foucault "takefs his] clew"

from the assum ed neutrality of foundational

language by insisting upon the violence of poststructuralist discourse. In the
first essay, he tries to expose "the prodigious machinery of the [foundational]
will

to truth"

that makes

"only one truth

appear

before our eyes'

("Discourse” 220). 3 Like Derrida, Foucault opposes a representational theory
of language and warns, "we should not imagine that the w orld presents us
with a legible face, leaving us to to merely decipher i t . . . . we m ust conceive
discourse as a violence that we do to things, or, at all events, as a practice we
impose on them" (229). This conception of discourse as violence, however,
results in a negative notion of freedom incompatible w ith Foucault's antifoundationalism and implies the very foundationalism he opposes.

When

he implies "things" have some prior, and presum ably better, existence before
language is ”impose[d] on

them,"

Foucault reverts to a foundational

epistemology. Although Foucault later distinguishes discursive pow er from
physical violence in "The Subject and Power," he does not avoid the
incompatibility

of a

concept

of negative

freedom

and

his

anti-

foundationalism .
In contrast to physical violence, Foucault adm its, "a society without
power relations can only be an abstraction" and discursive power does not
”constitut[e] a fatality at the heart of societies" (’T he Subject" 222, 223). Yet he
persists

in

describing

discursive

practices

as

external

impositions

or

constraints that the subject "is placed in" and internalizes, "turnfing] him- or
herself into a subject" (209, 208). These practices "give the ability to modify,
use, consume or destroy” and ensure "the m aintenance of privileges, the
accumulation of profits, the bringing into operation of statutory authority, the
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exercise of a function of trade" (217, 223). Foucault concedes that these
practices are productive, but never that they are very beneficial. Discourse
does not enable individuals, for example, to achieve greater security within
their material

and

social environment,

and this persistent rhetoric of

discourse as oppressive, if not violent, unfortunately leads to the postmodern
paralysis Bizzell observed in Berlin's postmodern course.
Because of this discursive oppression, a Foucauldian subject would
seek the negative freedom of escape from the dom inant discursive practices
instead of the positive freedom to act w ithin the complex

matrixes of

discourses already acknow ledged by this theorist. Yet if a Foucauldian subject
rejects the dom inant discursive practices entirely, then non-foundational
alternatives can be neither validated, nor disproven.

Foundational truth is

verified by its correspondence to a prior reality, but non-foundational truth is
validated in relation to

other previously yet tentatively accepted beliefs.

Within this network of contingent assertions, "doubts about our knowledge
are possible .

. . [but notj all at once" (May 98). Unlike an absolute

foundational reality,

this prior network is never assum ed to be "stable or

uniform" because "any part of the background may be brought forward for
questioning in

its ow n turn" (May 96, 99).

Yet Foucault's

rhetoric of

discursive oppression precludes this methodical consideration of separate
beliefs because the p ursuit of negative freedom deprives an individual of the
nececessary network of contingent assertions w ithin which to consider the
validity of a particular belief. Foucauldian subjects do not
revolutionary agency of

absolute resistance; they

instead

grasp the

are seized by

postmodern paralysis that gripped Berlin's students. An adequate account of
non-foundational agency m ust recognize that discourse is not neutral

41

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

w ithout insisting on its oppressiveness so that an individual's positive
freedom to act w ithin the complex matrixes of discourse can be m aintained.

Reconstructing a Deweyan Direction Beyond the Impasse
At the end of his career, Foucault finally "weakens his anti-modernist
edge" by reconsidering

poststructuralism 's assumed dichotomy between

society and the individual (Szkudlarek 55).

For Barthes and Derrida, this

dichotomy reduces the individual w riter to one who mingles prior cultural
sources and one whose absence permits endless signification.

Yet in T he

Political Technologies of Individuals" published posthum ously, Foucault
addresses the complications of postm odern subjectivity often implicit in his
earlier writings.

Foucault still warns, "individual life is becoming at this

moment a duty for the state,"
subjectivity
fo r m e d

(147).

yet he subtly revises his

rhetoric about

He examines the "political technologies which we have

in our societies," not the dom inant discourses that have formed us

(162, italics added).

T hrough this subtle revision, Foucault places the

postm odern subject in a dialectical relationship with

society's discursive

practices which represent his original concerns of power and knowledge. 4
Within this dialectic, an individual's discursive choices depend upon a
society's discursive practices, yet a society's discursive practices also are
dependent upon individual discursive choices. At the end of his career,
Foucault reconsiders the "poststructuralist tendency to overlook the power of
individual discursive voices" as the pragm atist literary theorist Louise
Rosenblatt has objected (Crowley

"Derrida"

180). The social and

the

individual, according to Rosenblatt, are "always implicated in [each] other" so
a critically

conscious individual can be more than a discursive object or a
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paralyzed subject ('Transactional" 385).
W ithin this dialectical relationship with the social, an individual can
develop agency through an intersubjective process. The theoretical question,
therefore, should no longer be the postm odern dilem m a quoted in chapter
one: "Can

writers control their writing process or

are their writing

processes -- and, indeed, the writers themselves — constructed by their
cultural settings?" ( How ard 349 italics added). The framing of this question
itself reveals the "determ inistic heritage of structuralism , still visible in
postm odern thinking" (Szkudlarek 56).

It requires an affirmation of either

the foundational precedence of the individual to society or the postmodern
priority of society to the individual.

In addition to his admonition against

developing a new philosophy "negatively,"

Dewey cautions, humanity

"likes to think in terms of extreme opposites. It is given to formulating its
beliefs in terms of Either-Ors, between which it recognizes no intermediate
possibilities" (Experience and Education 17). As he developed his own nonfoundational, pragmatist philosophy, Dewey did not "tak[e his] clew . . . from
that which is be rejected" and create a false dualism between the individual
and the social.
This dialectical thinker instead developed pragm atism "positively and
constructively" w ith many

of the concepts already discussed in the first

chapter and in this one. W ith Bakhtin, Dewey shares a dialectical conception
of society and the individual, but he also recognizes that the discursive forum
is not completely open which his Russian counterpart overlooked.

Like

Freire, Dewey believes that critical consciousness can be developed, but he
also does not predeterm ine Marxist principles to be its fruition as Freire does.
Like Bauer, Dewey realizes that resistance against the privileged must be
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balanced with identification of the other, and unlike Foucault, this pragm atist
philosopher advocates anti-foundational resistance w ithout creating an
epistemological crisis. According to Deweyan pragm atism , an individual can
achieve agency through a non-foundational process of knowing. As chapter
three will show,

if one attends "to the thematical prem ises from which

[Dewey's] more mature reflections procee[d] and the critically radical ends to
which they [lead]" (Gunn 73),

it is possible to avoid the postm odern missteps

and reconstruct a path beyond the current impasse.
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CHAPTER TWO NOTES
1. One of Barthes' later texts demonstrates the similarity of his structuralist
theory and Foucault's first writings. Com pare this quotation of Foucault and
Barthes' assertion that language is "the destroyer of all subjects]" in Sade
Fourier Loyola (qtd. by Burke 14).
2. It is helpful to note that the French title Tordre du discours" has been
translated as T he O rder of Discourse" as well as T he Discourse on
Language" because Bruce Herzberg and Kurt Spellmeyer have used these two
different translations respectively to refer to this one essay.
3. In "The Discourse on Language," Foucault describes three procedures of
exclusion by which "the production of discourse is at once controlled,
selected, organised, and redistributed" (216). These procedures consist of the
outright prohibition of certain discourses (such as homosexual desire in
contem porary Western society), the division into binary opposites with the
rejection of the subordinate (such as sanity and madness), and the will to
truth w ith its concomitant opposition to falsehood (216-7).
Foucault
ultimately argues that not only are the first two procedures arbitrary,
modifiable, and violent, but so is the third (218). Although he qualifies
"arbitrary” w ith the stipulation "if not developing out out of historical
contingency" (218), Foucault never examines its significance and persists in
this rhetoric of discourse as violence.
4. Foucault offers an inadvertant example of this dialectical relationship in
'T h e Discourse on Language." In the first sentence, Foucault states his wish
"to have slipped impereceptibly into this lecture . . . . to be enveloped by
w ords . . . . to have perceived a nameless voice, long preceding me, leaving
me to merely enmesh myself in it" (215). Then, he concludes by identifying
Jean Hyppolite, a deceased intellectual mentor, as the voice he "would have
wished for, preceding me . . . inviting me to speak and lodging within my
own speech" (237). Although Foucault wishes his m entor's voice w ould
"lodg[e] w ithin [his] ow n speech," he has done more than "merely enmesh
[himlself in it." Foucault's voice does not sim ply mingle quotations of prior
sources as Barthes contends, nor is its just an absence that permits endless
signification as Derrida claims.
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CHAPTER ffl

THE NON-FOUNDATIONAL ALTERNATIVE OF
DEWEYAN PRAGMATISM:
"The problems . . . of [traditional] philosophy are. . .
blocks to inquiry [and] blind alleys"

"[The concepts] of freedom and of a free hum an su b ject. . .
are hardly present in the discourse of postm odernism ,
apart from appearing as objects of deconstruction."
- - Tomasz Szkudlarek
'T he effect of the pragm atist move . . . is not to disconfirm
the subject but to reconfirm it." - - Giles Gunn

Like Derrida's deconstruction of absolute presence and Foucault's
critique of

autonomous subjectivity, John Dewey's pragm atic philosophv

opposes the tenets of foundationalism .

Deweyan pragm atism denies the

foundational beliefs that a know er has direct and unm ediated access to a fixed
and prior reality, this access yields reliable knowledge upon which one acts,
and

this knowledge can

language.

be conveyed

through

neutral,

unam biguous

Yet, as Dewey opposes these tenets, he does not "tak[e his] clew"

from the very foundationalism he seeks to reject.

He "surrenders] not

merely the old solutions, but the old problems" of foundationalism as well
("Need" 20-1).

For

Dewey realizes these problems involve irreconcilable

dichotomies or, what he term s, false dualism s created by flawed "E ither/O r
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thinking" (Experience and Education
solutions

to

these dichotomies,

17). *

Dewey

Instead of

offering

new

reconsiders the very premises

that produce these puzzling obstacles like the postmodern impasse of agency.
To "positively and constructively" develop
Charles Sanders Peirce, William
foundational

concepts

James,

and

pragmatic philosophy,

Dewey

reconsidered

the

of knowledge, language, identity, and philosophy.

Through this reconsideration, these pragm atists created a non-foundational
alternative that avoids false dualism s entirely. Deweyan pragm atism rightly
rejects classical and contemporary

dichotomies as "blocks to inquiry, blind

alleys . . . [and irresolvable| puzzles" (EN 9). This epistemological alternative,
for example, heralds postm odernism 's subsequent emphasis on discourse
without

locating the subject in a prisonhouse of language.

"the ways of experiencing" which include language,

By examining

Deweyan pragm atism

denies absolute certainty can ever be claimed yet affirms an individual's
ability to establish provisional meaning

(EM 15). Thus, unlike postm odern

anti-foundationalism , this non-foundational philosophy provides a tenable
theory of agency.

False Dualisms and the Pragmatic Reconstruction of Experience
Dewey reconsiders the premises of

"old” foundational problems by

tracing them to their classical origins. The ancient Greeks, he explains in The
Quest for Certainty, sought absolute truths because they had little control
over the frustrating vicissitudes of daily life. To feel more secure, the Greeks
worshipped mythical gods, like Zeus, then more abstract entities, such as the
Platonic forms. By assuming these ideals existed as an ultimate reality, the
*For brevity o f
E xp erien ce a n d

citation, the similar titles o f E xperience
and
E d u ca tio n
and
N ature will be cited as the respective abbreviations: EE and EN.
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Greeks could avoid the frustrations of daily life and seek invariant answers by
contemplating this realm.

If this reality

precedes and transcends

daily

appearances and activities, then contemplation of its ideals - - it was hoped
- - w ould provide absolute certainty. 1
To assume the existence of this ultimate reality, classical thinkers had
to confuse the known with the real.
reality

The Greeks actually believed in the

of the Platonic forms Truth, Beauty, and Goodness by generalizing

their knozoledge of particular examples, such as a true statement, a beautiful
face, and a good deed. Yet the Greeks reversed this reasoning to assume that
these transitory appearances were produced by the abstract ideals. They
confused, or better yet - conflated, their knowledge of good deeds with the
reality

of

empiricism,

Goodness. Even Aristotle, who rejected Plato's idealism for
inductively

developed

taxonomies of natural

forms, then

reasoned from his knowledge of these forms as though they were absolutely
real in order to posit the Prime Mover - God. Dewey identifies this conflation
of the known and the real as the "philosophic fallacy" (EN 27).
When this fallacy occurs, absolute concepts, such as T ruth and Beauty
or thought and language, are assum ed to exist. Convinced of the reality of
these abstract entities, the Greeks believed they could reason from their
knowledge of them in order to be more certain about transitory appearances,
such as of the true and the beautiful.

Yet once absolute aspects of a

foundational reality are believed to be known, the epistemological problem
then becomes to reconcile the false dualisms between them and create a
coherent philosophy. The Greeks' foundational reality has been reconceived
several times, but the problem of reconciling false dualism s persists.
Medieval Christians, such as Augustine and Aquinas,

replaced the classical

ideals with an eternal divinity, and Enlightenment Age empiricists, like

48

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

Galileo and Newton, substituted mathematical quantities for divine traits. Yet
when em pirical scientists, for example, conflated the mathem atically known
- - the quantitative - - w ith the real, they stripped science of any concern with
the im ediately experienced - - the qualitative. These scientists erected "a hard
and fast wall" betw een the individual who experiences the qualitative, the
world of

shapes and colors, and a foundationalist reality of quantifiable

objects and concepts (EN
experience and

and

48).

This false dualism between subjective

objective reality locates all qualitative aspects of

experience in the individual.

Mind is separted from m atter;

practice is

divorced from theory, and philosophers from Spinoza to Kant have struggled
- - in vain - - to put them back together again.
By exam ining the influence of language upon thought, postm odernists
like Foucault and Derrida have deconstructed the false dualism between the
m ind of an individual know er and the matter of a foundational reality.

Yet

as they redress the foundational neglect of language's influence upon
knowledge, postm odernists also risk creating another false dualism through
the philosophic fallacy. Like the foundationalists they oppose, postmodernists
analyze one aspect of experience -- in this case, language — as though it
precedes all others.

These anti-foundationalists reject one false dualism only

to suggest another in which discursive practices are assum ed to dom inate the
subject.

Unfortunately,

they cannot reconcile

discourse and subjectivity

because they too reason from their knowledge of language as though it were
absolutely real.
Unlike foundationalism which misconceives know ledge and the antifoundationalism which misconstrues the influence of language,
pragm atism begins w ith experience

Deweyan

"as the starting point of philosophic

thought" (EN 10). Dewey defines experience as an individual's interactions,
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or better yet - transactions, w ith the material and social environm ent. Late in
his career, he substituted the term transaction' for his previous use of the
word

interaction’ in order to emphasize that the individual and the

environm ent are m utually affected by each other.
experiences, Dewey insists, are

"had" initially,

undergone rather than known. Unlike
thinkers such as Plato and Locke,

These transactional

m eaning they first are

idealistic and realistic foundational

Dewey does not dism iss experiences as

mere appearances, nor does he mistake these transactions for immediate
knowledge. He distinguishes experience from knowledge by asserting the
primacy of experience.
From this philosophic starting point, Dewey reconceives knowledge
and language without creating a false dualism betw een them.

He instead

conceives of experience, knowledge, and language as dynam ically interrelated
concepts; one is not granted a paramount reality that is then used to
determ ine the other two.

Dewey opposes foundational knowledge without

reaching the postm odern im passe because he considers the influence of an
individual’s experience and knowledge on language as well as language's
influence

on

an

individual’s

experience

and

knowledge.

Dewey's

reconception of these fundam ental premises represents his philosophical
brilliance and

his dazzling difficulty of his thought for others. 2 Dewey’s

concept of experience, for example, cannot be com prehended fully until his
concept of language is also understood. Yet if one attends to the reconstructed
premises of Dewey’s m ature thought, the false dualism s of foundationalism
and anti-foundationalism are no longer irreconcilable, but irrelevant.

Experience and the Pragm atic Reconstruction of Know ledge
According

to

William

James'

famous

phrase,

experience
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is

a

continuous "stream of consciousness," a ceaseless flux of mental and physical
transactions (Principles, vol. I, 238).
experiences, these

transactions

As an individual undergoes these

do not have to be

enjoyed or endured

passively. To repeat an enjoyment, to end some suffering, or to satisfy one's
curiosity,

an individual can develop knowledge from this experiential

stream by becoming an active participant in a constructive process of inquiry.
This deliberate method begins when an individual tries to resolve the "felt
difficulty" of a physical need, an emotional desire, or intellectual curiosity
(Haw

107).

From the creative tension of a felt difficulty, an active knower

can engage in exploratory activity to define the problem. The problem is
defined by relating some, apparently significant qualities from the stream of
experience. As the problem is defined, a knower tries to form a hypothesis
which can be tested through deliberate experimentation.
testing,

Through such

knowledge not only develops from experience, but also returns to

experience for verification. The actual practice of this constructive process of
knowing, of course, is never as orderly as this neat description of its
components:

felt

difficulty,

problem

definition,

hypothesis

formation,

deliberate experimentation, and provisional verification.
The primacy of experience does not mean that all experiences are
relative and equal because the developm ent of knowledge enables an
individual to distinguish "educative" experiences from "mis-educative" one.
For an experience to be "educative" according to Dewey, it m ust fulfill two
criteria: "continuity" and "interaction" (££

37).

First, an experience must

have "continuity" w ith both past and future experiences so the anticipations
and expectations that constitute knowledge can be formed and tested. Second,
"interaction" between the internal and external factors of learning must be
balanced.

For example, a Deweyan educator can use a student's admitted
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aversion to writing formal literary analyses by asking him to write an
informal journal entry specifically addressed to a classmate.
factor of a student's dislike for formal criticism,

The internal

based on negative

experiences in the past, cannot be changed instantly. The eternal factor of the
learning environm ent, however, can be modified.

The journal entry

hopefully extends the student's past preference for informal writing. This text
then can be treated as a useful gathering of critical insights from which the
conventions of their m ore formal presentation, such as the difficult issue of
audience, can be developed.
Once this academic discourse has been composed, its differences and
sim ilarities with the original journal entry as well as w ith published literary
criticism can be exam ined to establish continuity w ith subsequent efforts to
write

formal analyses.

By fulfilling the twin criteria of continuity and

interaction, Dewey's ultim ate educational goal of grow th can be achieved, and
this grow th is the "reconstruction or reorganization of experience which adds
to the meaning of experience . . . [and| increases the ability to direct . . .
subsequent experience" (Democracy 89-90).
If an experience fails to fulfill the twin criteria of continuity and
interaction,

Dewey distinguishes this event as "mis-educative" because this

experience

permits a learner to continue a routine

reflecting upon its efficacy (EE

response without

37). In contrast, an educative experience

requires a learner to act deliberately

and to undergo consciously the

consequences of an action so that continuity with the past and the future can
be created.

During educative experiences, thoughtful reception alternates

constantly and cum ulatively with creative activity so Deweyan pragmatism
does not just reverse the foundational subordination of activity to thought.
It instead maintains "that action should be intelligent and reflective, that
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thought should occupy a central position in life" ("Developm ent" 19). Thus,
pragm atism "is far from the [American! glorification of action for its own
sake" as some of Dewey's critics have claimed; it is a non-foundational
philosophy

seeking

the

individual's

grow th

of

intelligent

activity

("Developm ent" 5).
Through this educative dialectic of thought and action, a knower can
achieve unexpected results so a knower should "leave the outcome to the
adequacy of the means . . . instead of insisting upon . . . a conclusion in
advance" (A rt

138-9).

As knowledge is constructed from continuous

experiences, a knower depends upon prior beliefs, but the results of this
process cannot be predeterm ined. Dewey's constructive process of knowing
may be better termed a reconstructive

process for two reasons;

knowledge is built using past beliefs, and it may rebuild

new

the significance of

some of those previous beliefs.
W hen an individual constructs a new assertion through this process,
this idea can alter the contextual background upon which which a knower
considers both prior and subsequent knowledge. This alteration can be so
subtle so as to appear to be a simple addition or so extreme
Kuhnian paradigm shift.

A n extreme contextual alteration,

to cause a

such as

from

geocentrism to heliocentrism, epitomizes w hat Dewey terms the "real though
lim ited"

constructive

("Development" 13).

function,

or

reconstructive

effect

of

knowledge

A new belief like Galileo's assertion that the sun, and

not the earth, is the center of the cosmos constructs a substantially different
context for experience. The
know ledge can yield

reconstructive effect is real because new

future experiences "which could not have been

produced otherwise" ("Development" 13). Yet the reconstructive effect is
limited because a new belief cannot alter w hat is experienced completely and
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perm anently. A lthough Dewey refutes all claims of foundational knowledge,
he does not deny the existence of an environm ent with which we interact
experientially.

There is som ething

experience from knowledge, he

out there', but by distinguishing

insists no direct knowledge of the inferred

reality is possible. A pragmatist knower can use past experiences to anticipate
the future, but he can never claim to have revealed the real. By conceiving of
knowledge as an anticipation of the future rather than a revelation of the
real, Dewey avoids committing the philosophic fallacy.
Because Dewey acknowledges

the "suffusive presence" of

"past

affairs" as knowledge is developed, he conceives of freedom positively (EN
249). He considers freedom to be the

"power to act" instead of a negative

freedom from external constraints (How

87). The negative concept of

freedom requires an emancipation from one's background
which is impossible.

According

of prior beliefs

to Deweyan pragmatism, this dynam ic

network of accepted beliefs is alterable but inescapable; the possibility of an
emancipating "direct appeal to nature" is only

a "fiction . . . . [because| We

bring to the sim plest observation a complex apparatus . . .
meanings and techniques" (EN
Dewey

avoids

the

of accepted

180). By conceiving of freedom positively,

epistemological

crisis

wrought

by

Foucault's

poststructualist critique and dem onstrated by Berlin's postm odern course.
Among

the

postm odern

anti-foundationalists

favored

by

contem porary composition theorists, Freire comes closest to these pragm atist
conceptions of experience, knowledge, and freedom. Like Dewey, he exposes
reified know ledge by including the knower, even a marginalized one, in the
process of knowing. Yet Freire prem aturely limits the constructive process of
knowing by predeterm ining its eventual outcome to be an undistorted reality
revealed by Marxism.

Even more than Freire, Dewey acknowledges,
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"the

ways

in which we believe and expect have a trem endous effect upon what

we believe and expect" because he does not circumscribe this process by
predeterm ining

its

(EN

results

15,

italics

original).

The

pragmatist's

developm ent of know ledge always retains a m odest awareness of its
tentativeness, its fallibility.
knowledge! . . .
5.587).

Peirce cautions, we know "the very best of (our

in only an uncertain and inexact way" (Collected Papers

Dewey likewise warns, the experimental m ethod of inquiry can

validate beliefs so they "may have a practical or moral certainty," but
knowledge "never lose[sj

a hypothetical] quality"

verification can only be assumed, not assured.

(EN

129). Future

Deweyan pragm atism offers

neither the comfort of foundationalism 's absolute certainty, nor the distress
of postm odernism 's paralyzing skepticism.

Experience, Knowledge, and the Pragmatic Reconstruction of Language
As

Dewey creates

a non-foundational theory of an individual's

developm ent of know ledge from experience, he also reconceives the role
language plays in this process.

He rejects the foundational concept of

language because this representational theory overlooks language's influence
upon knowledge and even experience.

A ccording to foundationalism,

knowledge reveals the real, an antecedent and absolute reality, and this
knowledge then is communicated through language.
present the reality known.It is this priority

Words name or re

of knowledge to language that

Dewey opposes and whose origins he explains.
Words, according to Dewey, "register [an experiential] relationship and
makes it fruitful in other contexts of particular experience" rather than name
the real (EN

155).

He uses the example of the word "fire" to explain that

language enables a know er

to anticipate

the possible conditions and
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consequences of this flam ing event. This word conveys our expectations that
"fire" can warm, cook, or b u m depending on its conditions (EN

154).

Language converts previously experienced events into considered meanings
for the future. As these expectations are confirmed by other, later experiences,
it is easy to imagine that "things, meanings, and words correspond" Dewey
cautions (EN

142). Yet this assum ption leads to the philosophic fallacy in

which knowledge of eventual outcomes is conflated w ith a reality of
antecedent objects

Once this prior reality is assumed to exist, then thought

can be misconceived by foundationalists as "complete prior to language.
Language thus

'expressses' thought as a pipe conducts w ater"

These flawed foundational assum ptions reduce language

(EN

141).

to a hollow

medium that carries individual thought - - a conception that Dewey does not
accept.
As Dewey reconstructs the foundational concept of language, he does
not oppose the false dualism between language and knowledge only to create
another between discursive practices and the individual knower.
neither overlooks,

Dewey

nor overstates language's influence; he and his fellow

pragmatists acknowledge the influence language has upon our knowledge of
experience.

Some beliefs, James explains, have been "built into the very

structure of language" because "these extraordinarily successful hypotheses . .
. straighte[n| the discontinuities of . . . immediate experiences" ("Pragmatism"
85). These built-in beliefs

constitute the background of prior beliefs upon

which subsequent experiences and developments of knowledge occur. O r as
Dewey asserts, "experience is already overlaid and saturated w ith the products
o f . . . past generations . . . . It is filled with interpretations [and] classifications
. . . which have been incorporated into what seems to be fresh [thought!" (EN
34).

Language is not a neutral m edium of sef-expression; it is a discursive
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system of "interpretations [andl classifications" created by "past generations."
Sim ilar to Bahktin, Dewey believes an individual's 'ow n' thoughts
develop through the collaborative relationships created by language.

As a

child acquires language, Dewey states,
The conceptions that are socially current and im portant become the
child's principles of interpretation and estim ation long before he . . .
[seeks] personal and deliberate control of conduct. Things come to him
clothed in language, not in physical nakedness, and this garb of
comm unication makes him a sharer in the beliefs of those around him.
CReconstruction 92)
Even

as

an

adult,

an

individual

is

influenced

by

this

discursive

intersubjectivity, this implicit collaboration w ith others.
In Art as Experience, Dewey uses the example of an artist to illustrate
this collaboration.

Every creative process involves both productive activity

and evaluative reception. Before the next brushstroke or line can be added,
an artist m ust undergo, meaning to experience, the consequences of the
developing

work.

These evaluative

pauses

are

often so short and

subconscious that many creators deny having any audience awareness at all.
Yet as they undergo their works in progress, these artists ”becom[e| the
receiving audience" by draw ing upon the concepts and the criteria built into
their creative medium, be they painter or poet (A rt

106).

Even the most

avant garde artist depends on her audience's conventional expectations even
as she tries to disrupt and redefine them.

In all communication, one

individual creates meaning through the comm on term s of a discourse and
tries to conceive the meaning "as it functions in [another's] experience" (EN
148).
Because we acquire an influentialu>ay

of experiencing from others

through language, Dewey states, no individual can ever "withdra[w| into a
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wholly private realm" (EN 141). O r as Peirce states, "a person is not absolutely
an individual" because all thought involves the collaborative enterprise of
language (Collected Papers 5.421).

Even w hen a w riter seeks the physical

isolation often associated with composing, this individual is involved in this
discursive intersubjectivity. Like

Dale Bauer and Kenneth Burke, Dewey

considers communication to be a discursive collaboration with the other.
W ithout

such

identification

w ith

the

other,

Dewey's

goal

of

"intellectual and moral growth" cannot be realized 0Democracy 362). Instead
of seeking w ider democratic associations, a group may curtail "full interaction
with other groups" in order to protect "w hat its has" (Democracy
Language can aid such prem ature
reconstructive collaboration.

99).

closure as m uch as it can foster

Like Foucault, Dewey acknowledges the power

relations implicit within discourse because language

"condenses meanings

that record social outcomes and presage social outlooks" (Democracy 46). 3
Yet this condensation of m eaning is not so thick as to be impenetrable. By
the pragm atist acknowledgment of

"the extent to w hich [the) ways [of

believing] are unwittingly fixed by social custom and tradition," a member of
a society can seek the deliberate coordination of these discursive and
conceptual influences if a positive concept of freedom is sought (E N

34).

Then an individual can pursue the pow er to act, meaning agency, through
the reconstruction of accepted beliefs using w hat Dewey terms "the tool of
tools . . . the cherishing mother of significance" - - language (EN 154).

Agency and the Pragmatic Reconstruction of Philosophy
As he acknowledges language's significant influence on experience and
knowledge, Dewey does not assum e the individual

is dom inated

by

discursive practices. He does not analyze language as an fixed cultural reality

58

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited w ithout permission.

then inhabit this theoretical structure with subjects who m ust be considered
"an effect rather than a cause of discourse" as Faigley does (Fragments 9).
Dewey

instead

influential

believes

ways

because

individuals
he

can critically

locates

individuals

examine
and

language's

language

in

a

transactional relationship. He readily acknowledges the influence of language
w hen he asserts,

"experience is dependent upon an extension of language"

(EN 143). Yet Dewey conceives of language with the same complexity with
which he considers experience. After asserting the dependence of experience
upon language, he imm ediately
which is a social product

stipulates in his next phrase,

and operation"

(EN

"[language|

143, italics added).

By

considering discourse as a social product and operation —or process, Dewey
is able to offer a tenable theory of non-foundational agency.
Language must be conceived as a process as well as a product because,
like society for Dewey, it "not only continues to exist by transmission, by
communication,

it

may

be

fairly

said

to

exist

in

transmission,

in

com m unication" (Democracy 5). As a social product, language only exists in
the process of its transm ission between individual members of a society.
When postmodernists analyze language as an influential product, they ignore
the process by which it exists. Although they "point out that the self . . . is
socially constructed," postm odernists "neglect to point out that the social . . .
is itself previously . . . constructed" by its individual m embers (Vitanza 157).
D uring their continuation of language, individuals can reflexively reconsider
its influence. Within a society, they can achieve the positive freedom to act,
m eaning agency, through the reconstruction of accepted beliefs and ways of
believing. This reconstruction is possible because experience and knowledge
influence language as much as language influences them.
As each person acquires language, they form a "personal linquistic-
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experiential reservoir" according to the pragm atist literary theorist Louise
Rosenblatt

('T ransactional" 381).

Through this personal internalization of

language, individuals can create variations of m eanings for a specific term,
such

as

subjectivity.

foundational m eaning

Postmodernists,

for

exam ple,

of subjectivity, a personal

have

varied

the

viewpoint upon

an

experience, by denying that an individual has any personal control over one s
perspective. In addition to such variations of meaning, postmodernists also
have substituted one term for another. They have replaced the foundational
term "individual" with "subject"

to indicate their opposition to any concept

of autonomous agency (Berlin "Poststructuralism"

18). As demonstrated by

the postm odernists’ ow n use of varied meanings and m ultiple terms, the
dom inant discourse is never so stable and uniform so as render the
individual a subject completely subordinate to discursive practices.

The

instability and heteroglossia of language create the discursive space for
individual agency.
Through

language,

Dewey

asserts,

all

"events

are

subject

to

reconsideration and revision" because "their m eanings may be infinitely
combined and re-arranged in [the] imagination" of individuals (EN

138).

These imaginative recombinations can lead to the reconstruction of prior
beliefs because the differences between these alternatives can be considered
and verified. In contrast to foundationalists, Dewey does not conceive of
verification as

correspondence to "a world [assum ed to be] already

constructed and determ ined" ("Development" 13).

He instead develops

Peirce's theory of m eaning in which meaning is determ ined by the effect a
belief has on one’s actions: "the purport of any concept is its conceived
bearing upon our conduct" (Collected Papers 5.460).

For James and Dewey,

knowledge becomes true when a belief permits an individual to achieve
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a

desired outcome. Yet verification is not just a m atter of 'w hat works'
imm ediately, for it involves the continued success of a belief in relation to
other accepted assertions.

The common connotation of "pragmatic" as

'crassly expedient' is far different from the philosophical denotations of
"pragm atist" and "pragmatism" for Peirce, James, and Dewey. 4
The pragm atist's standard of verification also differs significantly from
the postm odern criterion of coherence within an solipsistic system of
language.

For de Saussure and Derrida, an assertion can never be verified

beyond its statement
language as

in a particular discourse

a differential netw ork of signifiers.

because they conceive of
Or as Derrida

explains,

"[language is] a system of differences in which each unit is constituted in
reference to [another signifier)" ("Discussion" 8).

Since these signifiers refer

only to each other -- and not to a prior reality or to an anticipated outcome postm odern verification depends entirely on discursive coherence.
Based on the pragm atist theory of verification, knowledge never
attains absolute certainty, and

language never becomes a postm odern

prisonhouse. The contingency of belief means that the known cannot be
conflated with the real,
com pared with another.

but the consequences
In Experience

and

of

one assertion can be

Nature,

Dewey likens this

critical inquiry to
intellectual disrobing.
We
cannot permanently divest ourselves of
the intellectual habits we
take on and wear when we assimilate the
culture of our ow n time and place. But intellectual furthering of culture
dem ands that we take them off, that we inspect them critically to see
w hat they are made of and w hat wearing them does to us. (35)
O ur entire contextual background of beliefs cannot be cast off all at once, but
separate beliefs may be foregrounded for examination.
Through the process of intellectual disrobing, we can never remove all
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of the cultural garments we w ear at once in order to reveal

an "original,

eternal, and absolute" innocence or identity (£iV 185). But we also do not
have to be the passive occupants of postmodern subject positions. This
examination of one's cultural habits instead suggests the self is, and can be
deliberately, constructed as a "historic, intermediate, tem porally relative, and
in stru m ental" subjectivity (EN

185). Dewey's assertion of this alternative

theory of a self "in continuous formation through choice of action"
exemplifies this critical comparison of specific beliefs (Democracy 408). Upon
the background of his non-foundational concepts of experience, knowledge,
and language, he has weighed the consequences of asserting a theory of an
antecedent and absolute self

or

of a fluid and dynam ic

identity.

The

foundational concept of a complete self reduces expression to an impulsive
"spew ing forth," but the non-foundational concept means expression is "to
carry forward in development" (A rt 62). The crucial difference is that the
former emphasizes the pressing out of a product from w ithin and the latter
balances the creative self with the external conditions.

In this transactional

relationship between creator and conditions, the process or "m ethods . . . fare
placed) upon the [same) level of importance as has, in the past, been imputed
exclusively to ends" or the product (Quest 279).
The critical process of com paring contingent beliefs is not limited to
only extant knowledge; an individual can create previously unimagined
alternatives. Dewey, for example, practices the dialectical m ethod of his early
Hegelian training when he considers

the foundational conundrum

of

objectivity and subjectivity. Dewey examines the contradiction, or false
dualism , created by foundationalism between objectivity and subjectivity. He
rejects the thesis of

complete objectivity by acknowledging the knower's

influence upon the known. He also opposes the antithesis of total subjectivity
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by

affirming the discursive collaborations betw een individuals. He then

creates a synthesis according to which know ledge is objective and subjective
based on his reconception of those terms. As a culturally constructed product,
knowledge is 'objective'
(EN

as a "standardized habit . . . of social interaction"

157).

Yet as an individually influenced process, knowledge is also

'subjective'

because "every new idea . . . m ust have its origin in an

individual” who reconstructs prior beliefs (Democracy 346).
As Dewey theorizes the reconstruction of beliefs through individual
activity, he does not overlook the m yriad obstacles to individual agency
{Democracy 408). In Democracy and Education, he acknowledges, first, the
capacity for intelligence often is not realized because the vicissitudes of
m aterial comfort make

most people

unw illing

to tolerate

intellectual

uncertainty as well. Because "thinking is unsettling," many people will accept
dogm atism and dependence in order to avoid doubt when threatened by by
physical distress as well (380).
passivity

through

their

Second, schools foster this preference for

foundationalist

"principles

of authority

acquisition rather than . . . discovery and invention" (327-8).
reform

requires such great philosophical and

and

Educational

economic changes that

education based not on "telling and being told, but an active and constructive
process, is a principle alm ost as generally violated in practice as [it is] conceded
in theory" (46)!
After realizing schools alone cannot foster individual agency as he
initially had hoped, Dewey acknowledges the need for simultaneous social as
well as educational reform.

The moral theologian Reinhold Niebuhr

criticizes Dewey's meliorist theory of social reform by questioning whether
gradual, harmonious change is possible. Given the privileged class' desire for
self-preservation,

N iebuhr

objects:

"Failure

to

recognize

the stubborn
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resistance of group egoism to all m oral and inclusive scial objectives
inevitably involves them [liberals like Dewey] in unrealistic and confused
thought7' (qtd. by West 154).

Dewey, however, does realize the problem of

selfish preservation of social privilege. He considers schools to be political
institutions that are slow to change because of the "opposition of those who . .
. realize that [reform] . . . would threaten their ability to use others for their
ow n ends" (Democracy

373).

A better criticism of Dewey is that he only

partially recognizes the need for disruptive demonstrations to force the
privileged to confront a conflict in their values.

He acknowledges the

necessity of "public agitation [and] propaganda” as well as "legislative and
adm instrative action" to achieve social reform (Democracy

383). Dewey is

the first author of a philosophy textbook to use a labor strike as an example of
an ethical dilemma. Yet as a young professor in Chicago, he did not publicly
support the Pullman strike though he later granted his considerable stature to
the Trotsky Commission and m any other political causes (West brook 86-92,
480-2).

Although

it

is im portant

to

question

Dewey's

ow n

political

involvement, this criticism, I fear, asks too much from one man and
dim inishes his considerable accom plishm ents.
The

contemporary

neo-pragm atist

Cornel

West,

for

example,

dim inishes Dewey's philosophical achievem ents when he faults him for
failing "to articulate a plan of social reform" (85). For Dewey does offer some
specific suggestions for social reform, and W est's own prophetic pragm atism
provides even fewer details (see West
predecessor's

235-9).

West also slights his

considerable accomplishments when he claims Dewey seeks

both an evasion of, and an em ancipation from, the epistemological prob'em s
of m odem

philosophy because the first, negative word -- evasion -

dom inates his text and even his title - The American

Evasion of

Philosophy
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(87). According to West, Dewey attempts "intellectual regicide" as well as a
positive redirection of contemporary thought (89). Yet West is himself guilty
of evading Dewey's revolutionary rejection of not just the "old solutions" but
the "old problems" as well. Dewey's reconstruction of philosophy precludes,
rather than evades,

epistemological conundrum s like the postm odern

impasse over agency.
Dewey reconceives the problematic premises of foundationalism that
have created the false dualisms of classical and contemporary thought.

He

proffers alternative concepts of experience, knowledge, language, and self
which eliminate the persistent puzzles of foundational epistemologies. Yet
there still remains "a sufficiently large task" for Dewey's reconstruction of
philosophy' itself ("Need" 69). Instead of being the classical contemplation
or the m odem reconciliation of absolutes, philosophy, for Dewey, becomes
the pragmatist study of "what the known dem ands of us" or, in contemporary
terms, this consideration "of w hat is possible" is known as cultural criticism
(Democracy

381).

This reconstruction of philosophy eliminates false

dualism between theory and practice. For Dewey, "the only distinction worth
draw ing is not between practice and theory but between those modes of
practice that [are and[ are not intelligent" (E/V

290). The sufficient task of

philosophy is the study of cultural practices that should be repeated because
they are effective. Dewey does not — and given his assertion of knowledge's
reconstructive effect, cannot — provide any final blueprint of social reform; he
instead offers a comprehensive account of the process by which we can
reform society deliberately. 5 He offers a non-foundational philosophy with
which we can leam to create, critique and assert beliefs so we can "think of
[our|selves as agents, not as ends" (Quest 276).
Dewey asserts the primacy of experience as his philosophic starting
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point from which know ledge can be constructed, and he acknowledges
language's influence upon this constructive process and even experiencing
itself.

As validated beliefs are built into discourses, they can influence

subsequent experiences and our beliefs about previous ones.

Once these

influential ways of believing are acknowledged, a particular one can be
examined within the context of
assertions.

other related, tentatively

Depending on its consequences,

modified, or replaced

accepted

a belief can be maintained,

as an individual tries to fulfill Dewey's goal of

growth - the continuous reconstruction of experience to increase its present
meaning and to im prove the anticipation of future events. By theorizing an
individual's ability to influence as well as be influenced by accepted ways of
believing, Dewey explains the process of non-foundational agency.
It may not
tradition of

be easy to hear the resounding relevance of the tacit

pragm atism w ithin composition studies because Dewey offers

only a few, direct references to writing. Yet these few references should make
us lean

forward and

listen

very carefully because

they

whisper the

significance of pragm atic philosophy for contemporary composition; for
example.
Even a composition conceived in the head and, therefore, physically
private, is public in its significant content, since it is conceived with
reference to execution in a product that is perceptible and hence
belongs to the common world. (A rt 51)
This collaborative concept of composing in which neither the individual
writer, nor the discursive system predominant is one point where Deweyan
pragmatism, w riting process theories, and postm odernist com position studies
intersect, a point of intersection which is central to the issue of agency. To
arrive at this intersection,

however,

process-oriented

and

postmodern
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theories have to be read from an unconventional, alm ost non-Euclidean
perspective.

James Berlin and other postm odern critics resemble Euclid by

their contention that the parallel lines of w riting process and postm odern
theories never m et
postm odern

Berlin, for example, argues that process-oriented and

composition

are

m utually

exclusive

because

of

their

incom patible epistemological assum ptions about a writer, audience, reality,
and language.

Yet Deweyan pragm atism offers an alternative analysis in

which writing process and postm odern approaches do intersect, and through
this point of intersection, a new line can be draw n to redirect contemporary
composition beyond its current impasse.

This redirection, however, cannot

occur until the intersection of Deweyan pragm atism and w riting process
theories is located and m apped.
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CHAPTER THREE NOTES
1. This privileging of contem plation over activity had prior cultural and
economic sources in the negative associations made towards physical labor.
Classical philosophers, however, provided the "intellectual form ulation and
justification" for privileged Greeks to perpetuate this divisive epistemology
(Quest 30).
2. Later realists, like Newton, treated experience as the quantifiable source of
scientific problems, yet, like Locke, they failed to active the active role of the
mind in inquiry.
Newton, for example, declared, " I do not invent
hypotheses" and therefore ignored the influence of the knower on the
known (qtd. in Quest 115). Yet as Dewey quips, "The history of the theory of
knowledge would have been very different if instead of the w ord 'data' or
'givens,' it had happened to start with calling the qualities in question 'takens'
" (Quest 176).
3. Dewey repeats this non-foundational conception language w hen he states,
"[the] qualities we attribute to objects ought to be im puted to our ways of
experiencing them, and these in turn are due to the force of intercourse and
custom" (EN 34). As suggested by the final clause of this quotation, he also
appreciates the possibly, but not necessarily, insidious effect of discourse:
"[Language hasl unrivaled significance a a means of social direction"
{Democracy 39).
4. Peirce and Dewey were very ambivalent about the term "pragmatism." As
this term, in the words of Peirce, "was abused in the merciless way" of
literary journals, he relinguished it in favor of "pragm atirism " - - a term he
deem ed "ugly enough to be safe from kidnappers" {Collected Papers 5.414).
To develop a comprehensive, non-foundational philosophy, Dewey struggled
even more to establish alternative meanings for fundam ental philosophical
terms like 'experience/ In Experience and Nature (revised edition-1929),
Dewey explicitly names his theory "empirical naturalism or naturalistic
empiricism," and he alm ost never mentions "pragm atism " (1). When he
does, Dewey, like Peirce, abandons this term to the negative connotations of
others: "capricious pragm atism based on exaltation of personal desire" (198).
Despite these difficulties, I have decided to use "pragm atism " because its
positive, non-foundational denotation is being recognized recently, and I find
the aforementioned alternatives too aw kw ard and unappealing -- just as
Peirce wished.
5. Dewey's collected works reveal many more specifics on social reform than
Niebuhr or Cornel West adm it. For example, see "Unsettled Problems in the
Economic Order," "Unsettled Problems in the Economic O rder Continued,"
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and the specific applications of Dewey's thought suggested by Prof. Seager, a
colleague at Columbia. These proposals include raising the standard of living
and enacting worker safety and child labor laws (Middle Works , vol. 5, see
468-509).
Or see Dewey's article entitled "Federal Aid for Elementary
Education" (Middle Works , vol. 10, 121-29). Cornel West faults Dewey for
failing "to articulate a plan for social reform" yet his own prophetic
pragm atism is, at least, as vague (A m erican 85 and see 235-9). Like Giles
Cunn, I consider Dewey's pragmatic philosophy to be an initial, admittedly
broad, reconstruction of democratic culture. This reconstruction transforms
the traditional concept of democracy into a moral, economic, and educational
ideal as well as a political one (75). To demand that Dewey provides a detailed
as well as a comprehensive blueprint for this democratic culture ignores both
pragm atism 's commitment to only contingent answers.
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CHAPTER IV

FROM "EXPRESSIVISM" TO NON-FOUNDATIONALISM:
THE INTERSECTION OF WRITING PROCESS THEORIES
AND DEWEYAN PRAGMATISM
It's not a question of throwing out the innovations of teachers like
Elbow and M u rra y . . . it's a question of relocating those
practices and interests in a different theoretical context.
—Susan Jarratt
If the s e lf. . . does not exist as [anj agent, the process
approach to teaching w riting w ould seem to
be a sham — Robert Yagelski

When Janet Emig identifies pragm atism as one of the tacit traditions
within

contem porary

composition,

she

offers

only

the

one

sentence

statement: "John Dewey is everywhere in our work" ('T acit" 150). She does
not elaborate to support this assertion, but she does make a valuable
suggestion. She suggests the exemplary model of pragm atist theory and
practice created by "our greatest ally in literature research, Louise Rosenblatt"
(T acit" 150). Before I articulate the intersection of Deweyan pragm atism and
writing process theories, I want to follow Emig's suggested direction; I want to
venture from w riting process theories to Rosenblatt's pragm atist literary
theory to explain the beneficial consequences of putting Dewey's general
principles into practice.

1 hope this foray into a som ewhat foreign field will

create a new perspective on the too familiar terrain of contemporary
composition. This new perspective is needed because we are are in danger of
losing sight of the best practices of M urray's and Elbow's pedagogies. Too
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many composition teachers have become so familiar with the current
categories of composition

that complex and

effective writing process

practices have been reduced to and dism issed as "merely expressive" (Murray
" B u r 2 ). 1
After visiting Rosenblatt's pragm atist model in the allied area of
literature, I expect to return to the w riting process theories of Donald Murray
and Peter Elbow. Then, as with other homecomings, I hope we will see them
differently.

Discerning the pragm atist principles already at work in writing

process practices will relocate M urray's and Elbow's theories from their
presum ed
When

'expressivism '

viewed

within

to

this

their actual
pragm atist

non-foundational pragmatism.

context,

M urray's

and

Elbow's

literary

theory

pedagogies be explained and extended.

Rosenblatt's Pragmatist Model of Literary Interpretation
Although

Rosenblatt

began

developing

her

independently of Dewey, she has acknowledged her debt to his pragmatist
philosophy. 2 Her theory of interpretation and its instruction implements
Dewey's more general concept of experience, for she reconceives reading as "a
transaction between the reader and the text" (Literature 35, italics original).
Like Dewey denying foundational absolutes, Rosenblatt rejects the New
Critical notion that a reader interprets a literary text by perceiving a fixed
object.

She distinguishes the printed page that physically exists in space from

the literary w ork that is a particular "event in time" (Reader 12). The title of
her 1978 book -- The Reader, The Text, and the Poem

— makes manifest the

im portance of this distinction: it is the reader's experience with the text that
creates the literary work or "poem." A text is only paper and ink "until the
reader transform s them into a set of m eaningful symbols" (Literature 25).
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We must conceive "literature as exploration" — to borrow another title — as
Rosenblatt asserts in her m ajor work. 3
This pragm atist theory of interpretation and its instruction fulfills the
Deweyan principles of the primacy of experience, the constructive process of
knowing, the influence of language upon thought, and the achievement of
non-foundational agency.
instruction

must begin

Rosenblatt believes literary interpretation and its
with

the

reader's experience. She quotes the

nineteenth century literary theorist Walter Pater who urges "to know one's
ow n impression as it really is, to discriminate it, to realise it distinctly is the
first step" (Reader

131). This first step begins the process through which a

reader creates a literary work from the printed page. During this first step, a
reader constructs "hypothetical frameworks, entertains speculations . . . [and
discrim inates between] alternative responses" (Reader 137). These activities
usually are completed rapidly and unconsciously so reading may appear to be
"a passive process of absorption," but Rosenblatt instead insists, it is "an
intense personal activity" (Literature v).
To stress a reader's active role, Rosenblatt compares a text to a musical
score and asserts that readers need "to learn to perform in response to a text"
(Literature

279).

Like a musician, a literary reader should develop the

positive freedom to act in relation to a text.

This initial experience only

begins an interpretive performance because "a spontaneous response should
be the first step towards increasingly mature" reflections (Literature 75). After
this first response, a reader can develop greater knowledge of a literary work
through an interpretive method that corresponds to Dewey's constructive
process of inquiry.
Citing Dewey, Rosenblatt explains, the developm ent of interpretive
knowledge usually begins with some felt difficulty, an uncertain or a
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contradictory response to a text ( Literature 226). To resolve a difficulty, the
framing, speculating, and discrim inating that are primarily intuitive during
an initial response must become much more deliberate.

Rosenblatt requires

a reader to seek not only an initial response but also to ask "What in the text
justifies

[this]

response?"

(Literature

282).

In

contrast

to

Pater's

impressionistic criticism, Rosenblatt's interpretive method returns a reader's
attention to the text, but it also turns

a reader's attention towards two

directions a New Critic would not permit.
To resolve an interpretive difficulty, Rosenblatt's reader should follow
"ever widening circles of interest" that radiate from her initial responses to
the text (Literature 117). These w idening interests also expand beyond the
text to the cultural context of the w riter and the work. A reader could seek
biographical information, such as on Keats' short life,

to understand better

his recurrent theme of fleeting beauty. O r a reader could examine the cultural
context of Elizabethan drama, for example, to appreciate the significance of
the drunken porter's comedy in Shakespeare's tragedy Macbeth (Literature
117). These widening circles of interest expand not only beyond the text to
the cultural contexts but also before the text to the reader. As a pragmatist,
Rosenblatt places any single act of cognition within the context of previously
accepted beliefs so textual interpretation should involve "the parallel effort to
. . . understand and evaluate [a reader's! personal emphases" or prior
knowledge (Literature

96). Using student-centered discussions and other

collaborative activities, a reader's

assum ptions can be foregrounded for

examination. 4
As readers become aware of the possible, alternative responses made by
other readers, "the unspoken assum ptions behind [their] own judgm ents"
can be examined (Literature

120). This examination of one's own tacit
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traditions requires a reader to consider the pragm atist concern of language's
influence upon an individual's thoughts.

For many of these previously

unarticulated beliefs "have been unconsciously absorbed from the society
about" (Literature

253).

Once reading has been recognized as "deeply

conditioned by the social context," a reader can learn to try on and take off
many cultural beliefs like a Deweyan individual engaged in intellectual
disrobing (Reader

135). Reading, for example, Richard W right's frequently

anthologized "The Man Who Was Almost A Man" can prom pt privileged
students to reconsider conventional assum ptions about male m aturity and
individual responsibility. If a reader considers this story's historical context of
Post-Reconstruction share-cropping and fGan lynchings, then the applicability
of these dom inant beliefs to the main character Dave Sanders becomes
questionable. 5
As some students first understand the influence of social discourses,
Rosenblatt cautions, they "m ay think of the individual as completely at the
mercy of the dom inant [ideological| forces . . . . This is as erroneous, of course,
as is the earlier notion that the individual has complete free choice and selfdeterm ination" (Literature 254). Between these extremes, Rosenblatt asserts,
"We can

recognize the shaping power of . . . culture, yet

we

should

understand the possibilities of choice . . . [within] our complex culture"
('Transactional" 384-85).

For a pragmatist like Rosenblatt, there always is

"an individual hum an being choosing, selectively constructing meaning, and
consciously

and

unconsciously

responding"

to

specific

situations

('Transactional" 385). As explained in the previous chapter, an individual is
always involved in the continuation of society and its discourses so we
should seek more deliberate and critical consideration of the alternatives.
Thus, "we no longer need [toj accept [the dom inant ideologyJ as unthinkingly
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as the air we breathe . . . . we [instead can| have the knowledge to consciously
influence
(Literature

the

future

developm ent

of our

custom s

and

institutions"

159). By seeking the intelligent activity Dewey promoted, non-

foundational agency is attainable.
Rosenblatt is careful not to guarantee the achievement of greater
agency through literary reading alone.

Similar to Dewey stating his later

reservations about education leading social reform, Rosenblatt warns: "The
mere reading of a play by Shakespeare or a novel by George Eliot or Henry
James cannot in itself be expected to wipe out the effect of all the desensitizing
[social] influences"

(Literature

93).

Yet she maintains, practicing the

pragm atist process of literary interpretation "can be a means of helping
students to develop conscious resistance to those [social] influences" because
it can foster the habits of thought that allow an individual to become a more
reflexive and critical agent (Literature 93).
Rosenblatt's reader response pedagogy dem onstrates that Dewey's
philosophic principles can be enacted to teach students to achieve greater
non-foundational agency.

W hen this pragm atist literary theory is compared

to M urray's and Elbow's composition instruction, D ew ey's tacit tradition for
these writing process theorists can be articulated. We need to heed the
pragmatist principles of the primacy of experience, the constructive process of
knowing, the influence of language upon thought, an d the achievement of
agency already at w ork w ithin writing process theories, for when we do, their
resounding relevance to the postm odern impasse will be heard.

Murray's and Elbow's Pragmatist Construction of Knowledge from Experience
Like Dewey in theory and Rosenblatt in practice, Murray

accepts the

initial responses of student writers. He too begins w ith the starting point of
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pragm atist philosophy - the primacy of experience — by placing his trust in
student w riters' already "extensive contact w ith life and language" (Learning
152). He urges them to get w ords on paper, for once they begin to participate
in the writing process, he is confident they can learn to write and write to
learn. Student writers must learn to "write badly before [they! write well"
(Learning

49).

Once student writers have placed these initial w ords on a

page, they can learn to

revise this "productive

jumble" into a better

interpretation of experience (W rite 33).
M urray's process of writing

"to learn, to explore, [andj to discover"

expands towards Rosenblatt's w idening circles of interest and conforms to
Dewey's constructive process of knowledge

(Write

3). Like the expanding

interests of Rosenblatt's reader from response to text and from text to contexts
and on to another response, M urray describes the w riting process as "an
experim ental art" because a w riter m ust "try it, step back, observe, think,
redefine the problem, redesign the experiment, [andj try again" (Expecting
134). Yet in order to discern and discuss the w riting process, M urray explains,
"we m ust stop time (and therefore the process itself) and examine the single
elements . . .

in unnatural isolation"

(Learning

18).

Like Dewey's

constructive theory of knowledge, M urray believes the writing process
follows a "logical, understandable process" that involves collecting, ordering,
focusing, developing, and clarifying (W rite 4). A w riter's actual experience of
composing, of course, is far messier that this description, and Murray is
careful to explain that writing is a recursive rather than a linear process.
Like Dewey's non-foundational epistemology,
w riting begins and ends with experience.

M urray's theory of

He teaches student writers

to

approach ordinary events, such as a grandm other’s death, with an "open
susceptibility" (A Writer

2). While

student writers collect a "necessary
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abundance" of information, M urray advises them to look for the creative
tensions,

the

Deweyan felt difficulties that can lead to

"experiments in

meaning" (Write 63, Expecting 23). As a problem is defined, a student writer
should create a tentative idea that Murray variously refers to as a lead, a line,
and a focus. A writer follows this focus by developing and clarifying during
which various possibilities are tested against the em erging text, memory, and
literary expectations. As he tries one phrase or image then another, Murray's
commentaries about a draft un d er revision reveal the experim ental quality of
his composing process (for example, see Write
Dewey,

253-4). M urray, as much as

subscribes to a constructive theory of knowledge so he compares a

text to a photograph because "slowly, it evolves"
predecessor similarly asserts "to express . . .

and his pragmatist

is to carry forward in

developm ent" (Writer 11, A rt 62).
Elbow too upholds the pragmatist principles of the primacy of
experience and the constructive process of knowing. Like Dewey, he asserts
"an epistemology of experience" in which a writer begins by trying "to hold [a
preconceived] theory at bay . . . [and] articulate w hat happens" ("Uses" 67).
Elbow, for example, encourages students to write discourse that renders as
much as the academic discourse that explains favored by David Bartholomae.
As this non-academic w riting "conveys to others a sense of [the writer's!
experience," this rendering discourse "often yields im p o rta n t. . . insights such
as helping us see an exception [to] or a contradiction" of prior beliefs
("Reflections" 136, 137).

Similar to an initial response by Rosenblatt's reader,

this first rendering of an experience by Elbow's w riter

can reveal felt

difficulties that fuel the construction of new knowledge.
Like Dewey,

Elbow

considers

knowledge

interpretation" from experience (Embracing

to

be a

"process of

298). He identifies the two

77

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

fundamental forces of the constructive process of knowing; for Elbow, they
are his believing and doubting

games. The believing game does not seek

immediately "to construct or defend an argum ent but rather to transm it [or
enlargel an experience" ("Shifting" 288).

Believing supports creating, and

doubting fosters criticizing by "drain[ingj

the experience from an idea and

see[ingj . . . its pure propositionality" (Embracing

263). Although Elbow's

critics ignore his advocacy of the latter, he always has described writing as the
creative developm ent and

critical evaluation of meaning. The alternating

forces of believing and doubting, of creating and criticizing propel a writer
from felt difficulty to the problem definition and later from the formed
hypothesis to the deliberate experim entation of Dewey's constructive process.
Murray and Elbow conceive of experience just as James defines it; for
these

two

writing

process

theorists

and

this

pragmatist

philosopher,

experience is a "double-barrelled word"(James qtd. by Dewey E N 10). By this
definition, James means that experience involves both an im m ediate activity
and its interpretation as knowledge.

Through his advocacy of creative

freewriting and believing (in relation to criticizing and doubting), Elbow has
only sought to balance the two fundamental and contradictory forces of the
constructive process of knowing.

Neither Elbow, nor Murray advocates the

primacy of experience in order to preclude the development of knowledge.
M urray values descriptive and narrative writing that renders experience, but
he also considers analysis to be "as important to the w riter . . . as the wrench is
to the mechanic" so he encourages students to write reflective narratives
(W rite 142). In these "personal, but . . . not private" essays, there should be
both "immediacy and detachm ent" (W rite 100).
When Murray begins to construct meaning from experience through
writing, it is with the desire to see "what I have to say in the hope that w hat I
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discover will be significant' (Expecting 89). Yet M urray makes clear that a
text's significance can never be determined by only the writer.

Just as

R osenblatts reader considers the responses made by others, a construction of
meaning by Murray's w riter is verified by its consequences for others. In the
first edition of ,4 Writer Teaches

Writing from 1968, M urray stipulates that a

w riter "may write for himself, but he does not write to himself," and he
elaborates, "the writer does not exist without a reader [because) the purpose of
w riting is . . . to convey information" to another (3).

Murray subsequently

has enriched his notion of this verifying reader by positing the existence of a
w riter’s ’’other self” who anticipates public responses to a text

( Learning

167). M urray's "other self' perceives a draft just as Dewey describes an artist
viewing a developing image "as a third person might" (Art 106).
Although Murray insists on the influential role of an "other" in this
constructive process of knowing, his writing theory has been reductively
categorized as an impulsive, solipsistic pressing out or

'ex-pressing'

of a

Romantic self beyond inhibiting layers of social conventions -- hence the label
"expressivism." 6

Yet a w riter's "other self" is able to anticipate public

responses for Murray, and according to Elbow, a w riter is able to close her
eyes, to ignore her audience while composing

because writers can never

isolate themselves completely from the influences of social discourses (Elbow
"Closing" 61-2).

The discrepancy between M urray's and Elbow's writing

process theories and

the "expressivist"

label created by their critics is so

glaring, the time has come to ask why this inaccurate categorization, or
should I say - caricaturization, persists. Like Lisa Delpit discussing the process
vs. product debate, I believe this contest between "The Competing Theories of
the Writing Process" -- to borrow the title of one of its originators -- is "an
illusion created . . . by academics whose world view dem ands the creation of
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categorical divisions . . . for . . . easier analysis" (Delpit 296, see Faigley
"Competing"). I also agree with Tomas O'Donnell who asserts, "critics of
expressivism seem committed to attacking straw rhetorics of their o w n
making" ( 426, italics added).
The history of contemporary composition could

be

beneficially

rewritten if we considered cognitive process and social process theories of
writing as developm ents of as much as departures from the writing process
theories of Murray, Elbow, and their contemporaries. 7 Social epistemic
composition theories can be deemed developm ents from M urray's and
Elbow's pedagogies if the pragmatist tradition of the m odem writing process
movement is articulated, for Dewey heralds the contemporary concern for
language. Then the best aspects of M urray's and Elbow's composition theories
can be explained and extended until they bridge the apparent epistemological
chasm that divides them from the most effective practices of postmodern
w riting instruction.

Assuming and Acknowledging Language's Influence Upon Thought
Despite criticisms to the contrary, M urray and Elbow do assume that a
w riter is imm ersed in language. They do not believe that a writer's thought
or "inner vision finally exists apart from language" as Berlin claims (Rhetoric
152-3). Writing, for Murray, is "a process of discovery through language," and
his writing process pedagogy depends upon the influential currents of
discursive practices (Learning

15).

M urray encourages student writers to

follow "meaning-searching language" and to "allow language to lead [them!
to meaning" (Expecting

45, Learning

74). 8

Writers are able to begin

composing w ithout critically considering their readers or their purposes
because they can let themselves be supported by the buoyant medium of
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language.

Rather

than

urging

a

writer

to

swim

deliberately

after

predeterm ined intentions, M urray advises against trying to establish one's
purposes too quickly (Learning 44). Instead writers should begin composing
by

floating

uncritically

upon

discursive

currents

by

brainstorm ing,

freewriting, and mapping.
Although M urray's pedagogy depends upon a writer's immersion in
discourse, it is true that he rarely states this implicit assum ption as an explicit
acknowledgment.

Yet this omission does

not mean that "once [students]

start grappling — on the page— with meanings,"

M urray's writing process

pedagogy fails to "help [students! see how the traditions of form and language
help clarify thinking" (Expecting

103).

This quotation by M urray himself

suggests otherwise because in its entirety he states, "once [students] start
grappling — on the page— with meanings, we [instructors] can help them see
how the traditions of form and language help clarify thinking."

Murray,

however, has not explained an instructor's "help[ingj" a student understand
this pragm atist principle in

great detail. Yet this

failure to elaborate

by

Murray does not mean a w riting process theorist cannot do so. For Elbow has
acknowledged the influence of social discourses upon a writer's thinking, and
he has advanced several practices that enable students

to appreciate

language's influence w ithout underm ining their potential agency.
In contrast to Murray,

Elbow repeatedly acknowledges language's

influence upon an individual's thought. A writer, he declares, is "imm ersed
in discourse itself," and freew riting "exploits the autonom ous generative
powers of language and syntax" ("Shifting" 287, Embracing 59). For skeptics
who m ay wonder whether Elbow finally is heeding his critics, it is im portant
to note that even in his earliest texts, Elbow acknowledges this discursive
imm ersion,

in Writing Without

Teachers (1973), Elbow locates writers and
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readers in "speech com m unities" to explain interpretation as a transactional
process much like Rosenblatt's theory (155). And in "The Value of Dialectic"
(1975), he recognizes that "the hallmark of the tw entieth century"

is

examining "the lim itations of that system we work in m ost closely, the one
whose blind spots are hardest to notice: language" (Embracing 245). As he
acknowledges language's influence, Elbow is well aw are that others have
concluded that a w riter is "w ritten by language," but he is able to avoid the
postmodern impasse of agency ('T ow ard" 209).
Like his pragm atist predecessors and

his postm odern critics, Elbow

realizes that a w riter's immersion in discourse means that every individual is
engaged

in constant collaborative relationships w ith

others.

Dewey's

previously quoted assertion that "a composition conceived in the head . . . is
public in its significant content" could be attributed to Elbow. For this writing
process theorist states, "we can carry on thinking, w riting, and even talking,
while alone on a deserted island, but in doing so we are living off capital
accumulated through a com m unity process" (Embracing 293). According to
Elbow, the physical isolation of a deserted island or even a quiet study cannot
be confused w ith the ways of believing shared by language users. These two
quotations are so sim ilar because Elbow's writing process theory is "living off"
the pragmatist principles "accumulated" by Dewey, James, and Peirce, a debt
Elbow has begun to repay w ith interest.
In 'T he Uses of Binary Thinking," Elbow identifies "John Dewey" as
one notable thinker am ong several unnam ed others w ho recognizes that
"eith er/o r thinking is the problem " in the current controversy over whether
writing is either a social or an individual process (60). Elbow does not cite
Dewey's almost verbatim w arning against our tendency to "formulate beliefs
in terms of Eithers/O rs" (EE

17),

but he does quote the sim ilar assertion:
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'T he very idea of education is the freeing of individ u a l

capacity in a

progressive growth directed to social aims" from Dewey's Democracy and
Education

(qtd. in "Uses" 76, n.16) And in another recent article, he echoes

Rosenblatt as well as Dewey when he insists, "the personal . . . need not be at
war w ith the social.

The personal and the social are [often| reciprocal"

("Foreword" 13). It is this pragmatist transaction between self and society that
Elbow enacts in even his earliest textbooks.
In Writing

Without

Teachers

and Writing

With

Power,

Elbow

conceives of w riting as not an either/or matter, but as both an individual and
a social process.*

In W W T ,

Elbow is more concerned with an individual

w riter creating initial material than fulfilling a teacher's critical standards for
a final text. The apparently individual act of creating through even
freewriting, however,

is supported by

peer response groups who try to

believe a w riter's draft in order to encourage further invention, and
generation is only the first of Elbow's two explicitly stated goals. As
Christopher Burnham notes, the second is "to im prove [the writer's) ability to
make [one'sj own judgm ent about which . . . w riting to keep and . . . throw
away" (Elbow qtd. 164,

italics original).

Yet this individual judgment, like

that by Rosenblatt's reader, is fostered by considering the responses made by
others.

Elbow's w riter m ust assume the responsibility for revision that the

traditional teacher's red pen took from many students, but these decisions are
aided by knownng w hat material elicited the strongest and weakest reactions
by the supportive readers.

The social group represented by the peer

responders enable the individual writer to make more informed choices.
W W T , Burnham further observes, is only a "prelude" to W W P

in which

‘Given their similar titles, Elbow's two early textbooks will be identified as
W W T and WWP in subsequent references.
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response groups are

"used for both support and evaluation in an effort

to help a writer develop voice" (166).
In W W P , evaluation becomes an overt concern, and peer responders
practice critical doubting as well as supportive believing.

Informed by the

responses of the social group, the w riter seeks a powerful voice that can
communicate with the reader. This voice is not the revelation of a prior self;
it is the construction of

a contingent persona required by m eaning and

audience. It is only by distorting the purpose of peer response as eliminating
"inauthentic

writing" that Berlin and others can claim that Elbow (and

Murray) "deny the intersubjective, social processes of writing" (Rhetoric 14,
146). Yet as the guidelines of analytical responding, for example, dem onstrate
Elbow's writer is engaged in a collaborative, social relationship w ith her
readers as they offer other supports for, possible objections against, and
alternative conceptions of a m ain claim (see Sharing

27-8).

Like Dewey

advocating the "associated life" and even a postm odernist focusing on the
'o th e r/ Elbow advances a composition theory in which the individual
develops through social activity (Dewey Democracy 401).
Like Bumham, I believe Elbow's critics have overlooked his Deweyan
conception of the individual and society because they do not treat his earliest
textbooks as

the theoretical statem ents that they are. Although these texts

were written primarily for a "non-scholarly audiences," they do formulate a
theoretical explanation of composing
pragm atism

(Burnham

155).

that closely corresponds to Deweyan

Anyone

who

doubts

the

theoretical

sophistication of W W T , for example, should note Elbow's references to
Tertullian, Descartes, and

Thomas Kuhn, especially when the final figure's

The Structure of Scientific Revolutions

was not widely known when this

'textbook' was published (149,150, 166).
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W hen Elbow has written

for a scholarly audience, he accept some

responsibility, but let me stress very little, for his critics' confusion. In "Uses,"
Elbow explains his theory of writing as both an individual and a social
process, yet he inexplicably changes one of the terms of this controversy. He
substitutes the word "private" for individual. He defends his theory by
asserting that writing is both a

"private"

and a "social" process (60). He

acknowledges the facile argum ent that composing is always social because
"language comes to us from the outside," but he adds, "the language we speak
and write also comes to us from the inside" (60).
By considering language as a b o th /a n d process, Elbow is able to explain
that

it

is

the

social

aspect

of

language

that

stimulates

individual

developm ent, and during this development, it is the individual aspect that
maintains and remakes social discourses.

Thus, language involves the

"private" an d the "inside," meaning the individual, just as much as the
"o u tside/ m eaning the social. Elbow's critics, unfortunately, have not heeded
Dewey's w arning against

either/or

thinking

as well so they consider his

argum ent for the individual as a denial of the social. Yet Elbow explicitly
states, the individual and the social as "opposed sides can w ork together and
reinforce each other" in one theory of composing
entire

controversy

over

expressive

vs.

social

(61, italics original). The
epistemic

composition

pedagogies is itself another failure to avoid either/ or thinking.

The Achievement of Agency by Pragmatist Writing Process Students
With the acknowledgement of language's influence by w riting process
theorists, the potential agency of Elbow's and M urray's composition students
can be explained and extended. For pragm atism explains two practices Elbow
has cham pioned: freewriting and the believing and doubting games that
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foster greater non-foundational agency. Dewey's tacit tradition also can extend
the best aspects of M urray's pedagogy so that its current categorization as
"expressivist" becomes even m ore intellectually untenable and absurd.
As theorized and practiced by Elbow, freewriting enables a writer to
generate meaning because "w ords call up words, ideas call up more ideas"
(Embracing 59). A writer, "im m ersed in language" as Elbow acknowledges,
uses this unplanned, exploratory prose to exploit language's ow n generative
powers ("Shifting" 287). Yet this power of language to conjure more language
is not necessarily so great that the writer ultimately is the one exploited, taken
advantage of by the dom inant discourses. Through the unplanned invention
stim ulated by freewriting, a w riter may be able to disrupt as m uch as follow
the

conventional

currents

of

discourse

because

according

to

Elbow,

freewriting harnesses "the m ind's capacity for chaos and disorganization"
("Shifting" 288).

When practiced well, this unplanned com posing is one

form of what Elbow refers to as "first order thinking" which is the ability to
construct new conceptual term s from experience (W ithout draw ing an
absolute dichotomy, Elbow distinguishes this first order thinking from the
second-order which involves the ability to apply already-know n concepts to
new experiences; see Embracing

55). 9 The first order thinking fostered by

freewriting can "lead the person spontaneously to form ulate conceptual
insights that are remarkably shrew d" as demonstrated by Elbow's own insight
that, contrary to common belief, speech sometimes is better considered
indelible and writing, ephem eral — an insight I soon will discuss to explain
Elbow's

exemplary dem onstration of the agency achieved through his

believing and doubting games (Embracing 56, italics original).
Elbow believes that unplanned exploratory prose can stim ulate fresh
insights rather than just reproduce discursive influences because he does not
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conceive of

language

as a

monolithic whole

that predeterm ines

perception a n d expression of every new experience.

the

Instead, he considers

language to consist of m ultiple discourse, or speech, communities. In W W T ,
he cautions, 'T h e picture [of language] is oversimplified, however, if we talk
of only o n e speech community" (155, italics original). Elbow's more complex
image of "m any overlapping speech communities for each individual"
provides the discursive space for personal agency (155). Although the explicit
topic of Elbow's discussion of speech communities is the interpretive abilities
of individual readers, his theory of their agency applies
Elbow describes the "constant tug of war"

to writers as well.

between individuals who create

new m eanings and discursive communities that "curb this looseness" (154).
Like Dewey, Elbow considers language to be a series of "flexible transactions
among people" so both the process and the products of language use must be
considered (156). The process of individuals using language leads to subtle
variation an d

stark invention, and the products maintained by a specific

community lim it this alteration and addition.

Yet for neither Elbow, nor

Dewey can the existing product of one discourse community completely
control the ongoing activity of the individual agent.

Elbow likens

an

individual's alteration of m eaning to a "dream-like fluidity," but agency does
not have to depend upon only the unconscious invention of freewriting
(155).
As freew riting exploits the generative power of language, it also
exposes the conventional currents of discourse to scrutiny so an author does
not have to be conceived as being written by language. For Elbow, "valuing
experience . . . [does not leave] the articulation of experience unchallenged"
(O'Donnell 436). Like an initial response reconsidered by Rosenblatt's reader,
a first draft by an individual freewriting places felt difficulties onto the page
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where they can be identified and Dewey's constructive process of inquiry can
begin.

Elbow explains, writers "can think better when they examine their

thoughts . . . as a string of assertions arranged in space" across a page rather
than in the mist of the m ind ("Shifting" 284).

To encourage this conscious

consideration of our ways of believing, I, for example, ask the students of my
process-oriented

composition

course

to

freewrite

about

three

words:

"writing," "composing" and "experimenting" in order to foreground their
assum ptions about the first concept. The w ord "writing" too often functions
as a synecdoche; one part - transcription represents the whole - composing so
the experimental process of constructing m eaning is obscured, hence ignored
(see Brodkey 398). The equally problematic assum ptions that many first year
student writers have about "revision" and "research" also can be addressed
by asking students to freewrite about these crucial terms of composing. Thus,
freewriting can function, as Elbow states, as "Both an invitation to become
less self-conscious about writing" and "to increase our awareness of what we
have written"

('T ow ard" 210). This pragm atist analysis of freewriting

explains its efficacy to exploit a writer's social ways of believing and to expose
them to deliberate scrutiny.
A Deweyan w riting instructor likewise could extend M urray's classic
assignment by taking the

personal essay for a w ider social turn without

reaching the postm odern impasse. This assignm ent still w ould develop from
the primacy of the w riter’s experience. The student still would

narrate a

significant life experience, yet a Deweyan instructor w ould ask the student to
reflect not just on the significance of the experience itself as M urray does but
also on the cultural assum ptions implicit within

the narration which

influence her reflections.
To encourage a student to reflect on these cultural

influences, a
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pragm atist instructor would pose questions not usually asked in processoriented draft comments and w riting conferences. For example, when I was
teaching a process-oriented first-year writing course, one student named
Brian wrote about trying to maintain a friendship with an openly gay student
named Todd. Brian, who was a talented performer, described practicing dance
steps and songs with Todd for an upcoming college musical. Although these
practices were productive and enjoyable, Brian did not want to be considered
by others as being too 'friendly' with this

homosexual student.

As a self

described 'artsy' heterosexual, Brian worried about being labeled - in his own
words —a 'fag' by an intolerant peer. During our actual conference, I probably
asked Brian such typical process-oriented questions as "Was there a specific
incident that made you worry about being associated too closely with Todd?,"
"Are you trying to answer an intolerant student, to explain your concerns to
Todd, or to examine your own concerns?," and "How has this experience
m ade you think and act differently?"
To extend the efficacy of M urray's pedagogy and become more of a
Deweyan instructor, I should

have asked Brian to consider the cultural

assum ptions perpetuated by language, to reflect on the discursive practices
that influence his own stated ambivalence tow ards homosexuality. A possible
question for a show ing detail, a Murrayan "revealing specific," might have
made him mention a dislike for homosexual graffiti in public bathrooms that
solicits impersonal sexual encounters (W rite 61).

I then could have asked

him to consider the dom inant terms for a participant in such encounters.

A

heterosexual male who engages in loveless sexual encounters is commonly
referred to as a 'stud,' and a heterosexual female who does so is crudely
known as a 'slut.' A homosexual male, regardless of whether his sexuality is
expressed in a loving relationship or not, is called a 'fag.' An analysis of these
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terms may have led Brian to consider the "trem endous effect" of language on
our beliefs that Dewey asserts.
By confronting the conventional discourse of hom ophobia, Brian may
have begun to practice the intellectual disrobing, the critical foregrounding of
one

belief against a background of other accepted assertions that Devvev

advocates. Brian could have examined the effects of "w earing" the discourse
of hom ophobia and that of tolerance. He m ight have questioned why some
heterosexual men enjoy accusing other males of being a 'fag.'
behaviors elicit this accusation?

What

Why can some of these behaviors, such as

tears or touching, be construed very differently if they occur on a sports field
or a theatrical stage? Why does the patriarchal culture d raw such an abrupt
yet ambiguous distinction between male bonding and hom osexual desire? Is
sexual intimacy between two loving people

more im portant than the

patriarchal distinction between 'stu d ' and 'fag'? If loving intimacy between
any two people is more im portant than homophobic intolerance against same
sex intimacy, then does this assertion conflict with any other beliefs? Do any
of those beliefs silence an assertion that loving intim acy is more important
than hom ophobic intolerance?
Like M urray, a Deweyan instructor would w ant a stu d en t to engage in a
process of discovery. M urray has been much criticized for his his emphasis on
discovery, his insistence that "students become w riters at the moment when
they first write what they do not expect" (Expecting

3). Yet Murray

emphasizes discovery because only then are student w riters engaged in a
constructive process of inquiry. Both Murray and Dewey have few illusions
about the originality of these discoveries.

Murray believes a "writer's

illusion of innocence is essential" because it m otivates writing, but he
immediately stipulates all of a writer's "problems have been w orked out by . .
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. other[sJ" (Learning 8). Dewey also cautions, "Mo one expects the young to
make original discoveries" (Democracy 354).
By pursuing this process of discovery through language even more
than M urray acknowledges, Brian could have critical examined his ways of
believing and achieved greater agency. If Brian had decided that he believed
loving intimacy was more im portant than homophobic intolerance, he
would have been draw n into a transactional relationship w ith language itself
because the terms of homophobia are incompatible with this belief.
advocates of

Like

homosexual tolerance who have foregrounded the American

discourse of personal liberty, he may have considered the conflict between the
cultural discourses of homophobic intolerance and individual freedom and
concluded that the same-sex intimacy some refer to as 'an unnatural acf is
better conceived as a 'sexual preference.' He could have begin to participate in
the deliberate reconstruction of discursive practices that postm odernists often
overlook in theory. He could have learned to be an agent of ideas without
ever im agining himself to be the sole author of these thoughts. 10
One of Elbow's and M urray's critics may object to my pragmatist
extension of their writing process pedagogies. They may claim that my
Deweyan version of their composition theories seems as unrecognizable as I
consider their "expressivist" caricature to be, but Elbow's believing and
doubting games represent the fundamental forces of a deliberate Deweyan
re -construction of our current ways of believing.

Elbow advocates believing

and doubting in order to try on a n d take off particular ways of believing, and
by this

Deweyan act of intellectual disrobing, Elbow himself demonstrates

that greater non-foundation agency can be achieved.
In 'T h e Shifting Relationship between Thought and Speech," Elbow
believes and doubts the dom inant assum ption about talk and text that have
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been built into language, he begins by believing, or consciously trying on, the
dominant beliefs that speech is ephem eral and w riting is indelible. Speech,
he states, is ephemeral because it can be heard only once. Writing, in contrast,
is indelible because it is recorded on the more perm anent page. Elbow then
doubts or, takes off,

these assumptions that have persisted since Greek

Antiquity. Speech can be considered indelible because once we have spoken,
our words can never be retracted, only amended. Writing can be ephemeral
if a writer's first draft is not the final public one; w ith revision, print ceases to
be permanent. Elbow then advocates revised freewriting because it combines
the spontaneity and specificity of speech with the revisibility and reflexivity of
writing (see 285-91). Although Elbow may seem to be like Jacques Derrida
deconstructing a binary opposition between speech and writing, his analysis
actually relies on Dewey's dialectical thinking, the pragm atist preference for
maintaining the creative tension between b o th /an d rather than eliminating
either one or the other extreme.

For Elbow not only has dem onstrated but

also advocated this Deweyan dialectic of believing and doubting in theory and
in practice.
In 'T h e Value of Dialectic,"
that

Elbow advocates the dialectical thinking

keeps two opposed assertions in creative tension by affirming and

questioning each one. On the issue of free will vs. determinism , Elbow offers
the example: "If I think of my behavior as free, the best way to notice and
understand behavior that was hidden from me is to try to see it as
determined" (Embracing

241).

Like Dewey, Elbow avoids the tendency to

think in terms of eith er/o r extremes. He instead
thinker "to search for potential contradictions . . .

encourages a dialectical
to heighten them by

affirming both sides rather than by trying to resolve or eliminate them
immediately" (Embracing

251).

After believing each assertion to reach its
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limitations, Elbow then advises a dialectical thinker to doubt both in any way
possible, to deliberately disrupt the previous affirmation. Through this
conscious trying on and taking off of beliefs, Elbow hopes a thinker may be
able to achieve a more critical understanding, and possibly - alternative
conceptions, of the assertions exam ined.

Even then he does not engage in

sim ple eith er/o r thinking, for he advises the previous way of believing may
be considered as a "subset of the larger one, a special case that does not really
contradict [the alternative belief] if [it is] correctly restricted" (Embracing 251).
Elbow follows his own advice when he "restrict[s]" the role of doubting and
the related criticizing to later stages of composing without denying its final
im portance for effective composing.
Elbow has encouraged writing students to practice this dialectic of
believing and doubting. In one of his earliest publications, Elbow describes a
"non-disciplinary" -- or w hat we now call, an interdisciplinary -- course in
which writing students

examine a "single concrete particular" from "the

w idest range of conflicting models,

metaphors, hypotheses, conceptual

schemes and disciplines" (Embracing

9). By considering this range of

conceptual alternatives, a student is encouraged to apply, or believe, known
concepts to new experiences, Elbow's second-order thinking. The resulting
conflict of these multiple concepts causes a student to doubt each one as well.
This Deweyan act of trying on and taking off various concepts can provoke
Elbow's first order thinking which creates new concepts to understand better
an experience. More recently Elbow has suggested this intellectual disrobing
and redesigning by asking students to write two essays on one topic for two
different audiences. The contrast betw een the discourse expected by an
academic audience and the language desired by a non-academic reader tests
the w riter's knowledge and exposes the influence of

language, such as
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academic terms and colloquial phrases, upon this knowledge ("Reflections"
137, 151).

Elbow wants to teach his students "the principle of discourse

variation" so they learn to recognize the "different perceptions and reactions"
that result from different discourses, to realize language's trem endous effect
("Reflections" 152).
By theorizing, practicing, and teaching believing and doubting, Elbow
avoids committing the philosophic fallacy an d creating false dualisms.

He

does not extract one concept, such as the social, from experience and then
treat it as an absolute w ith which to consider the entire experience of w riting.
He instead has draw n upon his own experiences as a blocked w riter to create a
theory of both creating and criticizing, both believing and doubting, and both
individual and social. As Elbow explains, "My thinking grew out of a process
of trying to be true to my experience and to find a theory that did n 't violate it"
("Uses" 65).

Thus, Elbow's theory not only asserts the primacy of experience,

it also demonstrates the construction of know ledge from this first pragm atist
principle.

And

Elbow

is

aware

of the

philosophical

origins

of

his

epistemological practices. He has made explicit references to "William James
and John Dewey" to explain the developm ent of the m odem writing process
movement ("Uses" 65). Elbow has connected the pragm atist
emphasis on experience [to| the work of . . . Macrorie, Britton, Murray,
myself, and others. What these figures had in com m on. . . was a
burgeoning interest in the 'experience' of w riting . . . . People wanted to
talk about experience during the process of w riting, not just the resultant
text as product. 'Process' connotes experience. ("The Uses " 66)
Elbow

furthermore

correlates

the

"opening

period

of

the

'process'

movement" in composition studies to the corresponding interest in a reader's
experience -- the reader response movement led Louise Rosenblatt whom he
fails to name ("Uses" 67). Yet as I have tried to show, the writing process and
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reader response movements are parallel developments that both follow the
philosophical principles of Deweyan pragm atism .
It's time for contemporary composition scholars to practice Dewey's
intellectual disrobing; it's time to take off the conventional conceptions of
w riting as either

expressivism or

pragm atist

for composition.

design

social constructionism and try on a
It's

time

to reject

the

reductive,

dismissive, and just plain wrong categorization of Murray and Elbow as
"expressivists." As Elbow himself objects,
What really needs explaining is why there is such a tendency to see me
as one-sided and extreme, to see me as someone only interested in
generating, making a mess, and the private dimension; to be blind to my
my support for critical thinking, revising, doubting, and the social
dimension in writing - when I preach over and over this theme of
embracing contraries and of trying to get opposites into unresolved
tension with each other. ("Uses" 70)
Elbow can support his objection that the social aspects of his w riting process
theory have bee overlooked by his critics. For he has identified his assertion
of language generating freewriting, of the believing game, and of peer
response as three examples of his contribution to the social aspects of writing
("Foreword" 16). Elbow always has enacted a process-oriented pedagogy in
which students are "writ[ingj to each other . . . [and comment[ing| on each
other's writings" ("Closing" 64).

It does not require a large theoretical

reorientation to connect Elbow's collaborative course to Bartholomae's
learning sequence pedagogy, especially if one

remembers

the sequential

w riting assignments of another supposed 'expressivist' - W illiam Coles in
The Plural I. When the tacit tradition of Deweyan pragmatism is articulated
within the writing process theories of Donald Murray and Peter Elbow, I
believe it is possible to explain and extend the best aspects of w riting process.
And by this extension, these pragmatist practices can be combined with the
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most effective elements of postm odern instruction. Dewey has draw n
course beyond the current impasse over agency, and we have only begun
heed the possibilities of this new direction.
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CHAPTER FOUR NOTES
1. This quotation comes from a rejection letter received by Murray that
criticized his anonymous submission for being "merely expressive" and too
"M urrayesque" (Murray "But" 2). This kind of reductive and dismissive
response to writing process theorists is widespread. For example, at the 1996
College Composition and Communications Conference, one presenter
cautioned against the rise of the new expressivism which he w arned was the
same as Elbow's original expressivism based on the 'authentic se lf —a phrase
and concept that only appears in the analyses of Berlin and other critics, but
not in any of Elbow's own work. Like Christopher Burnham, 1 believe
"existing scholarship does not offer a close reading of [the] prim ary texts" by
Elbow and other w riting process theorists (155).
2. Rosenblatt, for example, admits her debt by stating, "Dewey's Art as
Experience especially left its mark . . . [with] its vision of aesthetic values
woven into the texture of . . . daily life," and Dewey's ow n change in
terminology from 'interaction' to 'transaction' was crucial to Rosenblatt's
successive editions of Literature as Exploration (Reader xi).
3. Sim ilar to Dewey, Rosenblatt adam antly opposes any false dualism s
between text and reader or reader and writer. As a reader engages with a text,
he "selects out and synthesizes - interanim ates - his responses to the author's
patterns of words" through "a continuing, constructive 'shaping' activity"
(Reader
53). Although a reader is an active participant in a literary
transaction, she should not dom inate this process of interpretation.
Rosenblatt's pragm atist emphasis on the reader does not disregard the
significance of the literary products created by writers and other skilled
readers. Rosenblatt carefully stipulates, "Nothing 1 have said . . . denies that
the text is the outw ard and visible result of an author's creative activity"
(Reader 15). Unlike the postm odernists Barthes and Derrida or even the
contemporary reader response theorists such as Stanley Fish and Jonathan
Culler w ith whom she is often associated, Rosenblatt's rebirth of the reader
does not require the author's death. N or does her emphasis on the student
reader dem and that the exemplary interpretations of published critics be
ignored. Rosenblatt only cautions that published criticism should only be
read after, and not before, a studenfs experience with a text. Criticism can
help clarify a stu d en fs own responses, but it should never replace them. A
literature teacher should never try to transmit these prior readings to
students as though they should be treated as the passive recipients of these
fixed objects.
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4. In addition to the student-centered discussions advocated by Rosenblatt, I
have found collaborative student journals to be very effective in fostering an
awareness of and a respect for the responses of others. I assign two students to
one journal and for alternating classes, they are responsible for responding to
their partner's previous comments and adding an entry for the reading due.
These collaborative journals usually become a constructive conversation that
encourages each participant to reconsider and reconstruct their initial
responses recorded in the journal and elaborated during class discussions.
W ith its ease and informality, email exchanges can replace the w ritten pages
of the paper journal, but it is the dialogic collaboration rather than its
m edium that is most important.
5. Richard W right's frequently anthologized 'T h e Man Who Was Almost A
Man" is a good text with which to foster this reflexive examination of a
reader's influential -- and socially influenced - assumptions. A student's
response to this story depends to a great degree on his or her prior beliefs
about male m aturation and individual responsibility. As the critic John
Loftis explains, this story parodies the traditional tale of masculine initiation
through hunting.
Unlike W illiam Faulkner's character Ike McCaslin,
W right's protagonist Dave Sanders, the son of an African-American share
cropper, is denied an initiation into m anhood through learning to use a
w eapon from an older male mentor (Loftis 437-442). If a reader interprets
Dave's impulsive acquisition of a gun and his accidental shooting of a mule
based on those traditional expectations for male maturity and individual
responsibility, then this seventeen year old is deem ed an im m ature youth as
some of my students respond. D ave's decision to flee the hum iliation and
the exploitation of the exorbitant price he m ust pay for the dead farm animal
then seems to be final proof of his im m aturity. Yet this interpretation ignores
the am biguity of the title that asserts as well as qualifies Dave's manhood, and
it overlooks the poignancy of the final line describing his departure for
"someplace, someplace where he could be a man." For Dave has not come of
age in a community that provides m odels for his maturation. He instead is
"treated like mule" from whom little assertiveness is tolerated. His father,
for example, accedes to the landlord's exorbitant charge and forces Dave to
subm it as well. The father's acquiescence and the m other's ulterior motive
for the
gun purchase — defense against racial violence -- suggest the
inappropriateness of traditional standards of masculinity. If students pursue
this story's w idening circles of interest to understand the Post-Reconstruction
era of share-cropping and Klan lynchings, then Dave's actions will be judged
to be more a m atter of racist exploitation than personal m aturation. By
placing the student's individual beliefs within a cultural context, the
appropriateness and the validity of these assumptions can be examined.
6. An increasing amount of scholarship has begun to call into question the
categorization of Murray and Elbow as neo-Romantic 'expressivists." In
addition to the articulation of Dewey's tacit tradition by Newkirk and others,
Stephen Fishman and Lucille McCarthy in "Is Expressivism Dead?" and
98

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

Sherrie G radin in Romancing Rhetorics have questioned the usual reading
of Romanticism as an asocial attem pt at self-expression.
7. Murray, for example, states that a "w riter m ust plan and calculate, scheme
and decide . . . makfe] a thousand executive decisions," and cognitive
researchers, led by Linda Flower and John Hayes, have sought to create a
mental model of this decision-making process ( Wri t er 6). Despite M urray's
own divisive title to 'T each W riting as a Process, N ot Product," the writing
process movement can itself be seen as a developm ent of as much as a
departure from current-traditional teaching.
W riting process instruction
made the m ethods of skillful product-oriented w riters accessible to more
students, especially those whose family discourse differed from the middle
class language privileged by schools. The w riting process movement, led by
Murray and Elbow, should be considered a democratization of the academy, it
is no coincidence that the attention to process parallels open admission
policies.
8. Although w riting process theorists are accused of offering a simplistic
account of agency, M urray actually foreshadows the postmodern problem
when he describes "being led by a piece" of writing (Expecting 141). Murray
assumes language's influence upon thought and suggests a way beyond the
current impasse w hen he conceives of writers as agents who "us[e| written
language to find out what they have to say" (Learning 31). As Dewey
explains, agency is possible by examining language's trem endous effect upon
thought.
9. First-order thinking, Elbow elaborates, involves "constructing new words
from experience" and the second entails "constructing new experiences from
words" (Embracing 33). Sounding like Dewey, Elbow does not draw this
distinction w ithout adding the disclaimer, "Of course, there is a continuum"
between these complementary ways of thinking, yet he insists "we can still
usefully treat them separately" (Embracing 14,15).
10. As many contem porary composition instructors urge their students to
seek greater agency, I believe we must be very forthright about its
consequences. Pragm atist knowledge dem ands action so Brian would have to
risk his own, sometimes tenuous, social acceptance if he were to defend his
homosexual friend against ridicule or worse abuse. He would have to weigh
the importance of his own immediate acceptance against the eventual
consequences for himself, Todd, and a homophobic student. Although I
would want Brian and any other student to defend another classmate like
Todd and become even more deliberate agents of social reform, I think
we need to be very honest about the possible consequences of such agency
and our own personal willingness to accept them.
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CHAPTER V

TOWARDS A SYNTHESIS OF WRITING PROCESS
AND POSTMODERN INSTRUCTION:
THE DEWEYAN DIRECTION
"A deconstructive reading of w riting pedagogy underscores the
appropriateness of much of the lore connected w ith process
pedagogy
[and] demonstrates . . . some alterations
remain to be considered." -- Sharon Crowley
"It takes nothing away from [postmodern] theorists to say that
sensible w riting teachers were implementing some aspects
of their theories in the classroom before the theories
were . . . articulated." -- Edward White

When postm odern composition theorists

explain

the classroom

implications of Derrida and Foucault, I'm usually struck by the fact that the
practices proposed resemble, and quite closely, the best aspects of Murray's
and Elbow's pragmatist pedagogies.

Teaching writing as a process, beginning

w ith student experiences, constructing knowledge from these experiences,
engaging in collaboration between writers and

readers, acknowledging

language's influence, and trying on as well as taking off various ways of
believing all are proposed as though no one else had ever advanced these
ideas, or if they did, Murray or Elbow m ust have m umbled these insights. In
A Teacher's

Guide to Deconstruction, Sharon Crowley, for example, describes

a deconstructive pedagogy that "would reinforce the notion . . . that writing is
a process" yet "interpret this slogan more profoundly" (46). By claiming to
interpret "more profoundly" w hat previously was only "a slogan," Crowley
shows with one hand and conceals w ith the other a significant similarity
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between her Derridean pedagogy and those of Murray and Elbow.
Crowley's profound interpretation of the writing process is to deny the
existence of any universal m ethods of composing and to assert 'T his does not
mean that the writing process can not be generalized about" (46). Her
generalizations, however, are very familiar to a practitioner of M urray's and
Elbow's theories. For example, she states " On the deconstructive account (and
in process pedagogy as well) writing is conceived as continuous and dynamic"
(41).

Based on Derrida's deconstuction of the author, the w riting process is

"continuous" since it is impossible to discern when composing exactly begins
and ends.

Composing also m ust be considered "dynamic" because it entails

endless collaboration and revision. By her parenthetical inclusion of "process
pedagogy," Crowley adm its yet minimizes these similarities; her parentheses
symbolize her attem pted m arginalization of Murray and Elbow.
Crowley tries to conflate writing process theorists and

current-

traditionalists by claiming, "a deconstructive analysis underm ines the notion
that

the

composing

begins

with

an

originating

author;

this

notion

characterizes both traditional and process pedagogies" (31). 1 In contrast to
these pedagogies,

her deconstructive instruction would dem onstrate the

"complicity" of writers and readers to disrupt the foundational concept of an
author (36).

Students w ould "read their colleagues' works-in-progress and

comm ent on them" so they would become "as much a part of their
composition as is the 'original' author" (37-8). But the "complicity" of writers
and readers Crowley claims for her deconstructive pedagogy closely resembles
the individual-social dialectic enacted by Elbow's peer response groups. For
Elbow is well aware that a w riter "can't give readers a finished product . . .
anym ore than a playw right can actually send a live play through the mail"
(W W P

315). Crowley's related assertion that a Derridean instructor would
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teach students to anticipate "the probable responses of the audience" again
resembles M urray's concept of the w riter's other self 04 Teacher's 42). Once
Elbow's and M urray's emphasis on the w riter is not considered according to
their critics' e ith e r/o r thinking about the individual and the social, their
em phasis on the w riter's process can be interpreted "more profoundly" than
"a slogan."
In a similar analysis of Foucault's pedagogical implications, Kurt
Spellmeyer concludes, student w riters m ust learn to seek "knowledge made"
rather than "knowledge received" (724). Students m ust start to "ask questions
for w hich no answers or containing forms wait ready at hand" (723). Thev
m ust -- dare I paraphrase, but whom? — write to learn, and when they do,
Spellmeyer continues, they will "speak first and then learn w hat [they] have
said and whom [they] have become" (723). Yet Murray has been categorized as
an 'expressivist7 for advocating w riting to learn which is "not so much selfexpression as self-exposure, and perhaps self-creation" (Learning
Bizzell criticizing

Flower and

Hayes' cognitive research,

137). Like

I find

these

postm odern pedagogies to be "a surprising mix of daunting complexity and
disappointing familiarity" (Bizzell "Cognition" 222). 2
Although Crowley and Spellmeyer, in theory, declare the social
construction of knowledge, they seem determ ined, in practice, to draw a
line in the sand between the "old" that includes 'expressivism ' and their
supposedly "new" pedagogies. These pedagogies, I will prove, include
som ething borrowed and something old as much as som ething new so a
pragm atist synthesis of their most effective practices and those of writing
process pedagogies is possible. Like Dewey and Elbow, I w ant to reconstruct
an e ith e r/o r opposition into a b o th /a n d dialectic that elim inates the possible
failures of each of these presently opposed pedagogies.
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Beginning with the Primacy of Experience
The Deweyan direction for contemporary composition begins with the
primacy of experience already enacted by Murray and Elbow. At a time when
New Criticism made most English departm ents "institution[sj of literary
studies unresponsive to student lives," writing process theorists "encouraged
students to write what mattered to them" (Jarratt 109). Like Murray, Elbow'
a n d Crowley, a Deweyan instructor would continue encouraging students
to select "issues that concern them directly" (Crowley Teacher's 38). These
topics, however,
game

and

would not be limited to such personal events as the big

the broken friendship as some m isguided

practitioners and their critics assume.

writing process

Instead these issues of direct concern

w ould be any topic with which students have enough experience and interest
to seek greater understanding. In my composition course, such topics have
included the everyday use of lasers, the thrills of reading fantasy literature,
and the identity problems of birarial adolescents. When students use familiar
language to write about these self-selected subjects, I, like

Macrorie, have

found their writing reveals "a surprising occasional command of metaphor,
forceful beginnings and endings, telling detail, word play, [and] irony"
(Macrorie Up taught 22). Yet the success and the possible failure of Macrorie's
pedagogy demonstrates a pragm atist composition teacher w ould not rely on
student experiences completely.
Macrorie named his pedagogy the 'T h ird Way" because he wanted to
avoid the first two alternatives created by the e ith er/o r thinking that pits
teacher control against student liberty (Uptaught 27). To achieve the third
possibility of student freedom

fostered by teacher direction, Macrorie

provided the student with "first, freedom, to find his voice and let his
subjects find him; and second, discipline, to learn more professional craft to
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supplem ent his already considerable language skills" (telling viii). Instead of
"complete freedom," this pedagogy sought Dewey's positive freedom as a
student learns to do more, to write better with an instructor's guidance
(Uptaught 27). Yet the possible failure of this student-centered and teacherdirected pedagogy shows that Macrorie's concern for h o w

students write

should not elim inate entirely the previous concentration on w hat students
compose.
To avoid the "bloated, pretentious" prose he ridiculed as "Engfish,"
Macrorie

dem anded writing that is "alive and honest enough to be

dangerous" (U ptaught

21, 27).

This dem and was successful, as even

Macrorie's critic James Vopat states, because a student

was engaged in

"asserting the worth of his own experience and feelings . . . . [writing] honestly
about actual event and emotional reaction" (41-2). Yet when an instructor's
concern for process does not include teaching students how professional
writers use this experiential immediacy to reach analytical insights,

Vopat

warns, "the student-centered class places such a prem ium on personal truth,
that there is a tendency to encourage and reward the sensational rush at the
expense of the considered response" (42). Macrorie's college textbook telling
w riting does include chapters on 'Tightening," "Sharpening," and "Writing
Critically," but it does not include sample texts by published authors to
dem onstrate the results of such revision and reflection.

Without these

exemplary products, the textbook's sections on revision and analysis were not
effective for Vopat's students.

They wrote "well and excitedly about their

personal experiences," but they were "at a loss when asks to write about ideas,
when asked to question values" (42). Vopat's prescient w arning means that a
composition course ultim ately will fail if it begins and ends with only
primacy of experience.

the

Like Elbow, a Deweyan instructor w ould encourage
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both discourse that renders a n d discourse that analyzes.
W ithout exaggerating the primacy of experience, a pragm atist pedagogy
also cannot overlook its im portance. Unlike the postm odernists Berlin,
Bartholomae, and Spellmeyer, a Deweyan instructor w ould not violate the
starting point of pragm atist thought and writing process practice. In a revised
presentation of his postm odern course, Berlin stresses the central importance
of "the response of students to the materials and methods considered" and
claims "We start with the personal experiences of the students" (Rhetorics
115, 116). Unfortunately, Berlin's continued rhetoric of discursive oppression
contradicts his pedagogy's supposed emphasis on experience because he still
wants his students to "negotiate and resist these [cultural] codes, these
hegemonic discourses"
negative

freedom

(Rhetorics

from

116). By advocating this pursuit of

external

constraints,

Berlin

creates

the

epistemological crisis faced by Foucault (as explained in chapter one).
Subjecting all previous beliefs to doubt denies an individual the necessary
context in which a non-foundational knower considers the alternatives for a
particular assertion.
Similar to Berlin, Spellm eyer requires a student to resist the dom inant
discourse because the Foucauldian "I speaks only in those m om ents when it
overcomes the rules designed to contain it" (716, italics added). This
postm odern assumption

that

student essays generally

are

w ritten by

discursive practices leads Bartholomae to respond to a student's initial drafts
by doubting rather than believing the account of her experiences. He declares,
"I begin by not granting the w riter her 'ow n' presence in [a| paper . . . . by
asking her to read her paper as a text already written by the culture . . . . I begin
by being dismissive" ("Response" 85).

By beginning w ith doubt and

dem anding a student start w ith resistance, a postmodern teacher induces the

105

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

paralysis observed by Bizzell in Berlin's course (as explained in chapter one).
For most students will resist this paralysis as much as, if not more than, the
dom inant ideology, which may explain Bartholomae's belief that it is the
teacher who m ust force students to question "the things that seem beyond
question . . . . It will not happened on its own, but only when prom pted"
("Response" 87).
Like

France's

call

for

critical

intervention

by

an

instructor,

Bartholom ae's "prompt[ing)" makes me ask Foucault's question of "Who is
speaking?"

Will it be the teacher or the student?

Crowley criticizes

traditional instruction because "the teachers do most of the w riting in
com position classes" through their syllabi, assignments, comments, and
corrections (Teacher's 35). Yet Bartholomae only recognizes student writers
as a speaking "I" if they "write against the grain of the [dominant! discourse"
("Response" 85).

Bartholomae, Berlin, and Spellmeyer define agency too

much in terms of resistance,
students'

prior

experiences

yet their conception of agency "dismisses"
so

these

writers

are

left

in

Foucault's

epistemological crisis. A Deweyan instructor, in contrast, would conceive of
agency as reconstruction as well as resistance. A pragm atist pedagogy w ould
neither exaggerate, nor understate the primacy of experience. Then the
sim ilarity that John Schilb notes between "teachers who want their students
to engage in personal, expressive writing" and "the attention to daily life that
theorists of cultural studies have shown" can be fulfilled (187). Following
Dewey's constructive process of inquiry, student writers would begin with
experience then develop knowledge that could

reconstruct as well as resist

conventional beliefs.
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Dewey's Constructive Process From Experience to Knowledge
Since experience

is James' "double-barrelled

w ord,"

its primacy

includes rather than precludes the construction of knowledge in a pragmatist
pedagogy. To foster this process, a Deweyan instructor w ould have to be wary
of the possible weakness of Macrorie's writing process theory: encouraging
"the sensational rush" too much.

Although prior experiences and present

abilities "furnish the initiating . . . forces in all education," Dewey also
cautions, "learning is not a m atter of [theirl spontaneous flow" (Democracy
133-34). By placing a prem ium on emotional rendering, Macrorie does not
encourage the constructive process of knowing enough. A nd when students
do not write to learn, M urray and Spellmeyer agree, "w riting [isj drudgery,
som ething that has to be done after the thinking is over" and "writing can
never be more than a mechanical reproduction" (M urray Expecting

3-4,

Spellmeyer 726). To foster "the considered response," a Deweyan instructor
w ould ask students to select meaningful topics that represent "questions to
which [they] need answers, problems to which [they} can use solutions, [and|
situations [they] need to . . . explore" (Murray W rite 29).
As creative tensions, these topics for inquiry w ould be resolved by
pursuing Dewey's constructive process from felt difficulty through problem
definition,

hypothesis

provisional verification.

formation,

and

deliberate

experim entation

to

Like Murray and Elbow, a Deweyan instructor

w ould teach composing as an understandable process that progresses —
recursively, of course -- from collecting to clarifying and involves believing
and doubting.

3

Similar to Murray and Elbow's preference for the first-

person essay, a pragm atist teacher would emphasize a w riter's active
participation in the construction of meaning.

Dewey's non-foundational

philosophy denies that an individual is a passive spectator of the known, yet
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the pragm atist em phasis upon a knower's activity does not mean this process
always must produce an original discovery.
Dewey clarifies an instructor's commitment to "w rite to learn" w hen
he explains, learning "should take place under such conditions that from the
standpoint of the learner there is genuine discovery" (Democracy 354). From
the perspective of the student writer, "this thinking is original" because she
is making meaning which has "not been previously apprehended . . . even
though everybody else in the world knows it" (Democracy 187). Like the text
for Rosenblatt's reader, meaning for a pragm atist w riter m ust be made anew
since knowledge does not exist as a fixed, foundational entity.
As Dewey advises, a pragm atist teacher w ould place the composing
process "on the [samej level of importance as. . . [its| ends," the written
product (Quest 279). This instructor would not invert the previous hierarchy
and privilege process over product because one false dualism should not be
avoided only to be replaced by another. To stress the w riting process, Murray
risked such replacement early in his career when he asserted "teach writing as
a process, not product" and "Process can not be inferred from product any
more than a pig can be inferred from a sausage" (Learning 14, 18). 4

One of

the implications of "teaching w riting as a process," Murray concludes, is 'T h e
text of the w riting course is the student's writing" so the texts of published
authors were excluded from the classroom - or so it seemed (Learning 16).
For Murray states another implication:
w hat

other

choices

the

w riter

might

"Papers are examined to see

make"

which

reveals

the

deconstructionst's supplem ent in the binary opposition of process over
product (Learning 17). An instructor's awareness of "other choices" involves
her knowledge of published texts as well as other student writings and

so

these texts were never really excluded from the classroom. To make students
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more aware of those alternatives, sample essays by published authors have
been reintroduced into m ost writing process classrooms. Even at such
bastions of 'expressivism' as Murray's University of Mew Hampshire, the
expulsion of published texts ended more than a decade ago. 5 Dewey's
definition

of a target explains the relationship between a product and a

process because "a target is not the future goal of [a shot]; it is the centering [or
aiming] factor in a present shooting" (Democracy 206). And the contingent
quality of these targets m ust be remembered because these products, like
language

for Murray, "evolve . . . rules are not w hat writers do, but w hat

writers have done" (Learning 151).
Given the tentative nature of pragm atist truths, an instructor cannot
always ensure the validity of a desired outcome in advance. As a Deweyan
instructor "involve[s] himself in [a student's] . . . exploration" as Murray
recommends, future verification cannot be assured, only assum ed (Learning
132). An instructor, therefore, should not let his greater knowledge of
alternative products, especially the preferred ones, make him intervene too
directly in a student's constructive process.

A pragm atist pedagogy, like its

writing process precursors, would remove "the teacher from the center of the
classroom," and this de-centering Jarratt notes, can also be considered "a
postmodern move, in the sense that the teacher [previously] was taken as the
locus of a Truth" (109). Yet as Dewey stipulates, "When [a teacher's] external
authority is rejected, it does not follow that all authority should be rejected,"
and Murray confirms, "student-centered does not mean permissive" (EE 21,
Learning 133).
Rather than recenter the classroom on students only, a pragm atist
teacher would try to maintain a dual focus upon the subject m atter as well as
students experiences (EE 56). As David Russell explains, Dewey believes an
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instructor "must consciously and carefully interweave the interest of the
learner w ith the dem ands of the discipline" (187). A pragm atist teacher's
know ledge of composition studies would inform the first focus on the
subject, but unlike a traditional teacher, an instructor would make not try to
transfer this knowledge directly.

Instead this knowledge of the discipline

w ould serve as a part of the "working resources" for a Deweyan instructor to
create

educative experiences for composition students (Democracy

214).

Students, for example, will learn about freewriting and language's influence
w hen these "general methods" help a writer "siz[e[ up the needs, resources,
and difficulties" of resolving a particular problem (Democracy 202).
students try to write to learn about

When

problematic topics, freewriting will be

useful to collect ideas and reflect on their significance; and during this
reflection,

understanding

language's

"constructive value" (Democracy

354).

trem endous

effect

will

have

a

Through this m anipulation of the

external factors of learning, such as by encouraging the selection

of

problem atic topics, a Deweyan instructor can stimulate students' growth.
M urray sum s up the authority of a pragm atist teacher w hen he advises, "In
teaching the [writing! process, we have have to look not at w hat students
need to know, but what they need to experience" (Learning

25).

It is the postm odern emphasis on revolutionary critique of presumably
oppressive discourses that make France and Berlin so eager to intervene in
the results of a student's constructive process. France, for example, wants to
predeterm ine that a student w riter will conclude incarceration should not be
primarily

punitive,

but

by

predeterm ining

a

student's

resistance

to

im prisonm ent as punishment, this student's active participation is thwarted.
Yet, "If the [constructive process] has worked in our case," Dewey asks, "how
can we assume that the method will not work with our students?" (qtd. by

110

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

Westbrook 507).

Berlin hopes that his postm odern course will enable

students "to bring about more democratic arrangem ents" (Rhetorics 116). Yet
his pedagogy is predicated on declaring the dom inant ideology undemocratic.
The prem ium placed on resistance — if 1 may allude to Vopat's criticism of
Macrorie — rew ards revolutionary criticism at the expense of reconstruction.
A Deweyan instructor w ould approve of a student's effort to reconstruct a
generally accepted assertion and to understand its validity.

A student's

reconstruction of the American ideal of democracy, for example, w ould be
valued by a pragm atist teacher just as m uch as a critique of its current
imperfections. Berlin, however, w ould value the second at the expense of the
first because of his emphasis on resistance against conventional beliefs.

Yet

this revolutionary emphasis can curtail a student's constructive process and
prevent the developm ent of any

critically understood belief.

A Deweyan

instructor w ould avoid intervention which curtails a student's constructive
process -- even when a questionable meaning has been asserted.
Like the contemporary w riting process theorist Lad Tobin, a Deweyan
instructor

should realize a students' need "to get detail dow n on paper, write

her way through that phase before she can (or dares to) shape it [and] interpret
it" ("Personal" 162). By encouraging discourse that renders like Elbow, an
instructor may have to read results that he finds objectionable. Tobin, for
example, felt moral dismay towards one student's topic, but he approached a
student

named

'T im "

with

"disarm ing

. . . empathy"

Bartholomae's ideological dismissal ("Personal" 173).

rather

than

In his essay, Tim

described his cat and mouse encounters with one store owner from whom he
repeatedly shoplifted merchandise. Instead of immediately dismissing the
m asculine bravado of this anti-social defiance of authority, Tobin asks Tim
conference questions posed "w ith curiosity and without judgm ent" that
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would further his construction of meaning, and this student was able to
construct further knowledge about his struggles w ith male authority,
especially that of his father, and his confusion about the collapse of his
nuclear family

("Personal" 173, 174-5).

By stim ulating a student's further

construction of meaning, a Deweyan instructor can fulfill the suggestion by
another postm odernist John Clifford that
students w ant to become writers . . . . because they are convinced they
have something to say, and more importantly, somebody to say it to.
They want an audience they can trust, one that encourages them . . . to
look carefully at the social contingencies of family, religion, gender, and
class that have shaped their unique histories. (46)
As Tobin fulfills Clifford's suggestion, the divisive barrier between writing
process and

postm odern pedagogies collapses.

constructive process will

By assum ing that the

work for our students, a Deweyan instructor can

encourage a student's active participation in this process w ithout anyone
assum ing that the resulting knowledge is the product of an autonomous
agent.

Through Individual-Social Transactions
SimiJar

to

her

writing

process

and

postm odern

composition

predecessors, a pragm atist teacher would teach student writers to construct
knowledge within an individual-social transactions because, for Dewey,
learning is an "active und ertak in g ! which involves m utual exchange"
(Democracy 352). Like Murray and Elbow, an instructor would enact this
dialectic through conference comments and peer responses so individual
writers learn to acknowledge their social influences. Rather than respond to
students' draft with the traditional "awk," a pragm atist teacher would offer
conference comments and questions like 'T his is exciting but I need a lot
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more. What did you hear? What did you feel?" as Murray advises and Tobin
dem onstrates (M urray Learning

151, 155).

By offering these provocative

responses, a Deweyan instructor would teach students to develop a w riters
"other self' who anticipates a reader's probable reactions. Using Elbow's peer
response groups, an instructor again w ould teach students to "assume the
point of view . . . [andi carry on an imagined dialogue with potential readers"
which Crowley urges in her deconstructive pedagogy (Teacher's 36). After a
response session, one of my students, for example, commented, "Her
contributions . . . helped me to revise and ad d things I couldn't see in my own
writing."

Like Murray, Elbow, and

Crowley, a pragm atist teacher would

dispel the foundational concept of a text as a container for a writer's fixed
meaning and reconceive the New Critical text as a collaborative site of
meaning m aking by writers and readers.
Like Crowley, Edward White, another contemporary composition
theorist, attributes this non-foundational conception of a text to postmodern
thinkers, arguing "there is a basic correspondence between [post-structuralist]
theories and the practices of the best w riting teachers" (187). Yet he fails to
notice pragm atism 's tacit tradition in the "very fam iliar ring" of postmodern
theories for contemporary w riting teachers (192). W hite links such practices as
write to learn through successive drafts and collaborative conceptions of text
to Derrida rather than Dewey. Yet composition instructors who "creatively]
misread . . . the drafts [they] receive" in order to perceive "possibilities as well
as [finished] products" rely on Rosenblatt and Dewey as much as Derrida and
the other postm odernists White credits (191).

It is Rosenblatt who asserts a

reader's active participation in constructing a literary text without denying a
w riter's contribution to the text the reader receives.

And it is Dewey who

explains an individual w riter's constructive process without denying the
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influence of social transactions.
Beyond M urray's conference comments and Elbow's peer response
groups, a pragm atist synthesis of w riting process and postm odern pedagogies
offers an instructor several other ways to engage an active knower in
individual-social transactions.

Like Bruce Ballenger and Kenneth Bruffee, a

Deweyan instructor could encourage students to construct knowledge by
researching w hat others believe about their topics. In The Curious Researcher
and The I-Search Paper, Ballenger and Bruffee ask students to resolve a felt
difficulty by writing researched essays. Unlike the traditional research paper,
these essays encourage the use of the first person "I" while the writer's
construction of knowledge involves not only the student's lived experience
but the experience of others' beliefs too. To m aintain the w riter's active role,
Ballenger asks students to engage in personal observation as well as
traditional library research. Using Ballenger's approach, I have found that the
non-traditional research helps to keep students actively involved and it
transform s their often foundational notions of library sources. Students begin
to consider the 'facts found in books' as assertions constructed by other
researchers like themselves.

As constructed knowledge, the information

gathered by library and non-traditional research can be questioned and used to
question the w riter's initial beliefs.
Like William Coles and David Bartholomae, a Deweyan instructor
could design learning sequences that enact individual-social transactions in
even more direct collaborations with other students.

In The Plural I and

Facts, Counterfacts, and Artifacts (co-authored with Anthony Petrosky), Coles
and Bartholomae create a sequence of assignments that require students to
write, read and respond to shared essays examining a common topic.
Through such collaborative inquiry, these writers fulfill Dewey's concept of
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education as "a constant reorganizing or reconstructing of experience" that is
neither an unfolding from within, nor a forming from w ithout (Democracy
89). Through all of these collaborative practices, a Deweyan instructor would
"prolong discursive tension" and "encourage . . . critical reflection on the
knowledge produced" as Spellmeyer recommends (727). Yet a pragm atist
teacher also would ask an individual to consider the less obvious influences
of language itself.
To engage a w riter in a transactional relationship with language, a
Deweyan instructor w ould encourage a student to examine discursive
practices as positive as well as negative influences. As described in chapter
four, a pragmatist teacher would extend the reflection within M urray's first
person essay by asking the student to consider not just the significance of the
experience but also the cultural assumptions implicit in the narrative.

The

purpose of this extended reflection is not to dismiss the student or to deny the
writer but to widen the circles of interest. This attention to social influences,
of course, can occur m uch earlier in the composing process.

Like Elbow, a

Deweyan instructor also w ould use freewriting to expose as well as to exploit
language's own "generative powers." An instructor, for example, could ask
Tobin's student Tim, after an early freewrite for his essay, to consider the
cultural models for his conflicts with male authority figures.

This question

w ould not be asked to curtail a student's constructive process but to continue
it by clarifying the experience.

If Tim were to relaize his shoplifting was

replaying his relationship w ith his father and this defiance repeated a
troubled teen, James Dean model of male rebellion, then he m ight consider
why he was responding in this anti-social way and whether there are other
possible responses. Such social reflection would widen Tim 's interests from a
narrative of shoplifting to an analysis of a male defiance that challenges his
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father as much as the store owner.

Although

student may

take this

acknowledgm ent of social influences to mean "the individual [is] completely
at the mercy of the dom inant forces" as Rosenblatt warns, an instructor
should ask these provocative questions to help an individual

make more

deliberate choices, to distinguish intelligent activity from routine actions as
Dewey advises (Literature 254).
To help students make more deliberate choices about language, a
Deweyan instructor also could engage students in the interpretive paraphrase
activity created by one of the first social theorists, Ann Berthoff. In this
activity, Berthoff asks students to offer one way of considering an idea, to
paraphrase that first statem ent to create an alternative, then to examine the
consequences of using this phrase versus that one (86). The differences
between alternative ways of believing are especially noticeable as students try
to write overtly persuasive essays. I, for example, use the sample topic

of

abortion (which so many students consider selecting) to show that so much
depends upon the phrase 'the fetus conceived' or 'the unborn child' which
many students uncritically employ.

Rather than intuitively adopt one of

these phrases, these writers can be asked to consider the rhetorical and logical
implications of each phrase upon the larger issue of abortion.

Instead of

assuming a phrase that predeterm ines abortion is right or wrong, students
can be encouraged to consider this central phrase and assum ption of their
essays.

This consideration leads to further examination of the definition of

life and the difficult weighing of all of the 'lives' involved. By considering
the phrases used in persuasion, students can be lead from a foundational
argum ent that tries to debate one issue in isolation to the non-foundational
consideration of a topic foregrounded upon a network of other related and
equally contingent beliefs.
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Because academic discourse is a central concern of their studies,
students also can consider language's influence by examining this issue.
Using the

collaborative inquiry advocated by Coles an d Bartholomae, a

Deweyan instructor could start a learning sequence by asking students to
freewrite about 'w riting in college/

From this first writing about their

experiences, students w ould begin constructing greater knowledge
subsequent discussion

during

w hich

the

"academ ic discourse" w ould be introduced.
students

generally

unknown

in the
term

of

After these initial activities,

would read and discuss several samples of academic discourse by

their ow n classmates that are draw n from across the curriculum. As they look
for sim ilarities and differences am ong these samples, the students w ould try
to compose collectively a definition of "academic discourse."

The students

then w ould read, discuss, and write responses to excerpts from recent
scholarship on this issue (such as by Elbow, Bartholomae, Nancy Sommers,
and Mike Rose). As Bartholomae advises, the students w ould learn to locate
and explore their 'personal feelings' in the larger context of others' 'published
know ledge' ("Inventing" 152). By contextualizing their developing beliefs, the
students w ould compose academic discourse about "academic discourse"
itself.

W hen I

followed this sequence of assignments in my composition

course, I found that many of my students rem ain wary of disciplinary jargon,
yet several realize that the specialized term "academic discourse" galvanizes
their previously unarticulated intuitions about this issue. As one of my
students wrote, "Until now I never understood why I've struggled to write
college papers, but after the readings and the discussions [on academic
discourse), I have a better idea of the differences between [personal and
academic writing]." This student and others began to realize the powerful and
often positive influence of discourse upon their thought so they could make
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deliberate choices between alternative practices. They began to achieve nonfoundational agency.

N on-Foundational Agency Achieved
A pragmatist pedagogy would begin w ith the primacy of experience,
foster the constructive process of knowing, and acknowledge language's
trem endous effect in order to culminate with D ew ey's intellectual disrobing.
By trying on and taking off particular alternatives, an individual can learn to
make deliberate choices betw een alternative

beliefs and ways of believing.

Like Carol Snyder, a Deweyan instructor could ask students to engage in
historical research to appreciate the discursive choices that have been made
already and their consequences.

Through an adaptation of Foucault's

genealogical studies, Snyder has created a researched essay that resembles
those advocated by Balienger and Bruffee. Snyder begins by encouraging her
students to question their, often foundational, assum ptions about the
classifications common to almost all academic discourses. To encourage these
questions, Snyder, for example, asserts, "the products of our acts of classifying
and dividing have only a historical reality," and she quotes the paleontologist
Stephen Jay Gould, "Historical changes in classification are the fossilized
indicators of conceptual revolution" (211). Then she provides the following
questions to guide the students' analyses of specific classifications:

1) What is the object of the classification system?
2) What does the classification exclude or overlook?
3) Who has devised a n d /o r employed these classifications?
4) When was this system devised a n d /o r modified?
5) Where was this classification system devised and where has it
been used? (212-14, paraphrased)
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Snyder hopes these questions lead her students "to see that the classifications
that

order

their

disciplines

are

m eaningful

hum an

inventions

with

significant effects" and they are "open to question and explanation, and thus
by writing about them might lead to useful discoveries" (215).

Unlike

Foucault, Snyder does not imply that the discursive systems are external
constraints from which one must seek an untenable escape.
Like a Deweyan instructor, she conceives of her students as individuals
who can seek the positive freedom to act within complex discursive practices.
She encourages her students to discover the benefits, flaws, exclusions, and
possible alternatives of particular classification systems.

Depending on the

consequences of these discourses, these students can choose to accept, alter,
reject, or replace these influential practices.
examinations of

By encouraging these historical

discursive practices, a Deweyan instructor, like Snyder,

would foster the trying on and taking off of particular ways of believing.
To foster Deweyan disrobing, an instructor could ask students to
examine

the contemporary as well as the historical diversity of discursive

practices. Through a learning sequence similar to Elbow's "non-disciplinary"
course, Kathleen McCormick and her colleagues at the University of Hartford
encourage students to understand "a given subject as it has evolved over
time" (1). After this historical research, students then examine some aspect of
a common topic as "it is understood by different people in different ways
today" (1). The ultimate assignment is to present a detailed analysis of the
"range of contemporary perspectives on the subject and . . . their historical
antecedents"

then

to assert a

specific

position

which

examines

the

"advantages and disadvantages of taking up one or another perspective" (17,
18). Rather than "reporting" the knowledge of authorities, students are
encouraged to "develop an authoritative voice" and use their knowledge "for
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a rhetorical purpose" (2). By weighing the "advantages and disadvantages" of
each perspective as in BerthofPs interpretive paraphrasing, they consider the
consequences of one way of believing versus another to establish an opionion
and purpose "of [theirj own" (2). As they learn to practice this process of
intellectual disrobing, these students are becoming non-foundational agents.

Pragmatic
creating a

philosophy

provides

a comprehensive

fram ework

for

pedagogy for teaching student writers to be non-foundational

agents. The Deweyan principles of the primacy of experience, the construction
of knowledge, the acknowledgm ent of language's influences, and the critical
disrobing of unexam ined beliefs indicate a direction beyond the postmodern
impasse because a pragm atist writer is neither an asocial individual pressing
out an innate self, nor a passive occupant of prior subject positions.

A

pragm atist writer is an individual who has learned to construct beliefs from
experience, to participate actively in individual-social transactions, and to
examine "what [particular beliefs 1 are made of and w hat w earing them does"
(EN

35).

A pragm atist w riter fulfills Dewey's assertion assertion that "the

role of the individual . . . [is| the reconstruction of accepted beliefs"
{Democracy 346). By this reconstruction of beliefs and ways of believing, a
pragm atist w riter is an individual whose

identity is "in continuous

formation"so it must be understood as "historic [and]

tem porally relative"

(Democracy 408, EN 185). Lacking an identity fixed by either an innate self or
a prior discursive position, the pragmatist writer can establish M urray's
authentic

or McCormick's authoritative voice, but this vital tone is a

construction as contingent as any other pragmatist assertion.

The current
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controversy over 'voice' can be resolved by rejecting the false dualism
betw een experessivism's innate self and postm odernism 's subject positions.
Although

Deweyan

pragm atism

can

help

resolve

such

current

controversies as w riting to learn, an instructor's intervention, and a student's
voice, this non-foundational philosophy offers no final blueprint for a
com position pedagogy; its commitment to continuous reconstruction forbids
any attem pt to draw one.

As I have tried to synthesize the best aspects of

w riting process and postm odern

instruction,

there still must be great

variation between actual pragm atist composition courses.

A pragmatist

pedagogy enacted by Murray probably w ould emphasize a writer's active
participation in the construction of knowledge from experience.

One by

Elbow w ould stress exploiting and exposing language's tremendous effect
through freewriting and peer responses.

Another by Crowley would assert

discursive influences sooner to hasten deliberate choices between alternative
ways of believing.

The grave danger for such variations is that one

pragm atist principle would be stressed so much that it precludes the
fulfillment of another.

As Vopat's and Bizzell's criticisms demonstrate, a

composition course should not, for example, em phasize w hat has been done
- experience, or what may be desired - resistance, at the expense of constructed
knowledge. Yet the current taxonomies of composition pedagogies encourage
just such imbalances by categorizing expressivists who teach writing as an
entirely individual act and social epistemicists who teach composing as a
completely social process.
The brilliance of Deweyan pragm atism is its rejection of such false
dualism s by reconceiving such fundam ental philosophic terms as experience,
knowledge, and language and considering them in a dynam ic relationship
instead

of binary oppositions.

When this difficult

reconception
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is

understood on its own terms, then a pragm atist composition pedagogy is
possible.

Like philosophy for Dewey, contemporary composition studies

then becomes
381).

a question of "w hat the known demands of us" (Democracy

As I have articulated the resounding relevance of D ewey's tacit

tradition, I have been able to understand better the efficacy of many aspects of
M urray's and Elbow's writing process pedagogies that I already practice. The
primacy of experience, for example, explains the importance of students' self
selected topics, and the constructive process of knowing clarifies mv
expectation for and my involvem ent w ith a student writing to learn.

The

influence of language upon thought will make me ask students (like Brian in
chapter four) to extend the reflection w ithin their personal essays. I will seek
student reflection beyond the event's significance to its cultural context

for

those topics such analysis is appropriate and those writers ready for such
further reflection.

Rather than dem and every student writer resist the

dom inant discourses, I will try to seek Dewey's goal of grow th more
consciously. For students composing the vague prose of Macrorie's Engfish, I
will encourage them to render their experiences in greater and more vivid
details.

For other writers already engaged in extensive reflection, I will ask

them to deliberately try on and take off different ways of believing and
compare their consequences.

I also w ant to prompt other composition

scholars to take dow n the divisive barriers of "expressive" and "social
epistemic" pedagogies.

I plan to reconstruct the best aspects of these

composition practices as a pragm atist theory of composition instruction, and I
hope to inspire others to design and implement other, sim ilar Deweyan
pedagogies so we and our students can "think of [ourlselves as agents, not as
ends" (Quest 276).
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CHAPTER FIVE NOTES
1. Similar to Crowley, m any other other postm odern theorists try to conflate
the current-traditional w riter with that of writing process theories. Clifford,
for example, asserts, 'T raditional and expressive rhetorical theory . . .
unproblem aticallv assum es that the individual w riter is free, beyond the
contingencies of history and language, to be an authrentic and unique
consciousness," and his use of
"theory" in the singular rather than the
plural 'theories' conflates them completely. Faigley repeats this claim with an
im portant qualification that w hen Murray states, "the w riter is constantly
learning from the w riting w hat it intends to say," this statm ent "gestures
tow ards a D erridean view of writing, where m eaning is continuously
deferred as added meanings displace earlier meanings. But Murray could not
pursue such implications because he theorized the source of meaning in the
mind of the individual w riter" (Fragments 245, n.9 and see 225). But does the
assertion that M urray's w riter is conceived as an autonom ous author reflect
M urray's own belief that "once [students] start grappling — on the page -- with
meanings, [instructors] can help them see how the traditions of form and
language help clarify m eaning" or his postm odern critics willingness to
displace this belief and add on their attem pted conflation with currenttrad itionalism (Expecting 103)?
2. There are other similarities between the best aspects of w riting process and
postm odern composition instruction beyond considering w riting as a process,
asking student writers to select personally m eaningful topics, encouraging
w riting to learn, decentering the traditional classroom, advocating an
instructor's involvem ent to further this process, and acknowledging the
transactions between writers and readers. Crowley, for example, believes a
deconstructive pedagogy would disrupt traditional teaching based on
"generic categories," and M urray too advocates revising narrative prose into a
poem or a first person essay into a more objective analysis (41). She also
proposes, a deconstructive teachers "would sensitize their students to the
institutional realities in which they write," and Elbow has urged teaching
discourse variation to increase students' awareness of the "institutional
realties" of academic discourses (47).
3. Although M urray's process 'ends' with clarifying, he has no illusion that
absolute clarity is possible. Like Crowley, Murray considers the writing process
to be endless; it ceases because time and m otivation run out (see "The
Maker's Eye").
4. Murray later softened this pig-sausage dichotomy betw een process and
product by explaining that writers can "read within the page [of another
writer] . . . bringing their own experience with their craft to illuminate the
hidden craft of [that] writer" (Write 5, Expecting 63-4).
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5. One of my main assertions is not to deny that Murray can be categorized as
an 'expressivist/ Instead it is that the best aspects of his pedagogy can be
understood better by considering him from a pragm atist perspective. As
shown by my reading of M urray's implications for "teaching writing as a
process," M urray's writing process theory can be interpreted according to
postm odern principles rather than those of New Criticism. The definitive
interpretation known as 'expressivism ' — offered by postmodernists -- can be
deconstructed and
reconstructed into m uch more than naive neoRomanticism. Murray can only be m ade to fit into the smooth, round hole
labeled 'expressivism ' when the multifacted, square edges of his theory are
worn off.
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